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The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly

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The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947

EDWIN A. ELLIOTT
*National Labor Relations Board**

Since August 22, 1947, the effective date of the Labor-Management Relations Act, those of us of the National Labor Relations Board both in Washington and in the field have been busy in study of the Act and its legislative background, with establishing and learning procedure for its administration, and attempting faithfully to apply its principles, as we understood them, to the cases coming before us.

We have been cautious in our answers to questions, for we, too, are trying to find our way in the administration of a new and complex law.

We realize that a part of our administrative function is educative, and to do well that part we must have experience dovetailed with our study. For this reason we have waited until experience was had before we began speaking to groups about the Act.

Labor will now be judged by its conduct under the law, much more so than by what labor may say against the law.

To conform to the law in full is now the appropriate role of labor, just as it is the appropriate role of management.

As one interested in democratic ideals and processes, I should be the last to urge anyone to withhold criticism of any of its provisions, but I do urge that the Act be given a fair trial, for only by compliance, by use, and by integrity of administration can a law in a democratic society be tested.

We now have a Labor-Management Relations Act—not merely an act to protect labor, but an act devised in interest of labor, management, and the public. All of us, then, have a stake in its scope of action and in the integrity of its administration.

Management will be judged by its restraint in taking advantage of its new-found prerogatives under the Act. It will be tragic short-sightedness for employers to hope that the Act will provide them with a weapon to weaken labor—their customers.

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We, the administrators of the Act, invite both management and labor to utilize our services, but never as a substitute for dealing peacefully with one another. (With all emphasis let me say that the Act is not and was not intended as a cure-all. The nearest to a cure-all in labor-management relations that we know, is the practice of honest, fair, good-faith collective bargaining among the parties.) The fewer matters brought to the government by labor-management groups the better. We are happier to learn of a controversy being settled by agreement among labor and management than we are in having it settled by a Board or Court decision.

We cannot give all of the answers, nor can we solve all of the problems involved in labor relations. As all human relations cannot be solved by statutes, neither can labor-management relations be solved by this or any other so-called labor-management law. Common-sense cooperation, tolerance, and eager desire for understanding and good will shall never, in my opinion, be successfully substituted by legislative action.

Our General Counsel and our Board, I am sure, would join with us in urging that labor not fall into the error committed by the fifty-eight lawyers of the Liberty League, who advised that the Wagner Act was unconstitutional and urged employers everywhere to a policy of non-compliance. The Wagner Act was not held unconstitutional, and those employers who followed the advice of the fifty-eight brought expense to themselves and chaos into labor-management relations.

Inflexibility characterizes dictatorship, while change characterizes democracy. Here in our country we can still enjoy the sport and the essentiality of change and experimentation. The pendulum swings one way and then another, and by this motion and change we test our institutions and keep them responsive to our people.

This law of change and the institution of experimentation are applicable to the field of labor-management relations. Our representatives at one time choose to protect one group and in another period they choose to protect another group. In our democracy public opinion can judge these changes and appraise them. An informed public opinion is our best weapon against excesses whether they be practiced by management or labor or government—thus the need of tolerance of differing opinions, thus the need of understanding; and always there is the need of experimentation.

When the Wagner Act of 1935 became law, conditions demanded it. The wage-earner was yearning for his place in the sun. He wanted to share in the fruits of democracy for which he had worked and which he had been so long denied. Not all, but too many employers unilaterally granted wages which were exploitative and denied to the worker and his family the standard of living adequate to their needs. I recall a truck driver coming into the office in the 1930's whose working hours were 60, and who was paid \$13 per week. I remember that in 1912 clerks in chain stores worked for \$4 to \$7 per week. One man with a wife and

two small children, who worked on the delivery dock of a great department store, was paid \$16 per week. Too little attention was paid by the employer to the conditions under which wage earners were compelled to work. Too much attention was given to speed-up. At the same time the employee was helpless if he complained or asked for correction of those conditions, for if he did so, too often it was at the cost of his job. If he sought to organize with his fellow workmen, too often he was denied that right. Lock-outs occurred, yellow-dog contracts were imposed and gunmen, finks and goon squads appeared.

The Wagner Act, in recognition of these conditions, was designed to provide him with protection in urging his complaints, and to require the employer to listen to them and to try fairly to find a mutually acceptable basis for their correction when approached by a representative freely chosen by a majority of his employees to discuss such matters. (It was wholly a corrective measure—built to remedy the abuses that had no place in our social structure.)

Most of you remember the protests of industry when the Wagner Act became law: it was vicious; it was unconstitutional; it deprived employers of established rights to conduct their business as they pleased in all its phases. But it proved not to be unconstitutional; and, except as it was abused, it was not vicious. The only right of the employer which it abridged, was to restrain him from imposing on the human rights of his employees. The viciousness of that Act, if there was any in it, rested not in the fundamental principles which it embodied, but in the abuses that grew out of its application.

Because all labor is made up of human beings, and because labor, in the group sense, was expected under that law to act collectively, there were at hand, as there always are in such situations, the usual number of opportunists who became labor leaders overnight. In all too many cases, they "took over". They developed many techniques and procedures for the so-called advancement of labor, that were wholly at odds with both the moral and legal codes most of us had been taught to follow. The sit-down strike, the mass picketing, the coercion used on reluctant employees to induce them to join, and the manner in which some labor leaders would approach an employer with the admonition that he sign a contract with them "or else"—were just a few of the techniques used by some leaders to impose their new-found power.

There were featherbedding and the jurisdictional strike which won so much public disfavor for labor. To be sure, some of the techniques were helpful and constructive, but too often they were unconscionable.

These practices were not general by any manner of means, and I have no intention to infer that even a substantial minority of labor organizations engaged in them, but unfortunately, there were enough who consistently did so to build up a slowly rising tide of public indignation against the whole structure.

Under the protection of the Wagner Act and the principles which seemed to govern its early administration, a substantial number of these techniques which were not eventually tabooed by the courts or by the later decisions of the Board came to be looked upon by that segment of organized labor which had originated them as inalienable vested rights which were just as inherent in labor in its relations with employers as the employers had regarded their practices toward labor, prior to the passage of the Wagner Act.

Such circumstances could have only one result; just as the Wagner Act had restricted employers in the exercise of their so-called "rights", legislation imposing similar restrictions on labor organizations in the exercise of certain practices they had developed was clearly indicated. It came in the form of a bill embodying a series of amendments to the National Labor Relations Act.

With the passage of that bill, we again heard familiar protests that the law was vicious; that it was unconstitutional; and that it took away established rights of long standing. This time, though, the protests were from labor's side. Both sides of the employer-employee relationship are now required to observe well-defined restrictions and both have reciprocal rights and responsibilities.

At the beginning, we were told by the critics of the Act that it clearly was a weapon made available to employers to break down the union movement and that we would quickly be deluged with charges against unions growing out of resentments that had been accumulating over the years. For this, as with almost all other dire predictions, there has thus far developed no basis of fact. The employers have made only the smallest possible use of the Act. Of the 1069 unfair labor practice charges filed from August 22, 1947, to December 1, 1947, less than twenty-one per cent have been filed by employers. In our own Region from August 22, 1947, to June 1, 1948, of the ninety-seven charges filed, only ten were filed by employers, and each of them except one has been withdrawn by the employer after investigation or dismissed by our office as having no merit. The rest of the unfair labor practice charges, eighty-seven in number, were filed by employees or labor organizations against the employers. This clearly indicates a willingness on the part of most of the employers of the nation to disregard what has happened in the past and to use the Act as it was intended to be used—as a balance wheel for their future labor relations. And while we are dealing with percentages, it is also interesting to note that during the past nine months in our Region, only six petitions seeking an election to determine representation were filed by an employer, and less than seven per cent of the total of 438 petitions were filed by employees to test the representative capacity of an incumbent union under the decertification proceedings. The functioning of the Act seems to be settling down to what we have hoped would be its ultimate pattern. The wonder to us is that it has

done it so rapidly. In all candor we must say that time has been too short to test fully the Act in all its aspects. It is pointed out that thus far it has been functioning in an era of high employment—a seller's market and high productivity. It may well be as some think that the real test of the Act will come when the economic cycle moves into the period of recession or depression—in that era the moral fibre of both management and labor and the Act will have the severest test.

The Labor Management Relations Act relieves the employer of none of the restrictions and obligations imposed upon him by the terms of the Wagner Act. He still may be brought before the Board on charges if he interferes with, restrains, or coerces his employees in the exercise of their right to join or refrain from joining a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. He still will be subject to an unfair labor practice charge if he interferes with, dominates or supports a labor organization designed to act as the collective bargaining representative of his employees. He still may not discriminate with regard to the hire or tenure of employment or any of the working conditions of an employee or encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. He must continue to recognize membership in a labor organization. He must continue to recognize the right of his employees to file charges with the Board and to testify before the Board, and he may not visit reprisals on such employees for so doing; and he still must bargain in good faith with the freely chosen representative of his employees concerning matters affecting wages, hours, rates of pay, and other conditions of employment. But to equalize these employer restrictions, restraints have been placed upon labor organizations that prohibit them from engaging in practices that had become prominent in the Wagner Act days, and which, in the opinion of Congress, contribute as much by way of interfering with commerce as do those acts which have been proscribed to the employer. An outstanding characteristic of these provisions is their recognition of the fundamental principle that labor organizations exist for the benefit of the employees—not that the employees exist for the benefit of labor organizations. They provide that employees are to be protected against restraint and coercion from labor organizations in the exercise of their right to join or refrain from joining any labor organization. They make it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause any discrimination against an employee under the union security provisions that are permitted in the Act, for any reason other than the failure of such employee to pay his dues and initiation fees. They require the union to bargain with the employer with the same degree of good faith which the employer must exercise. They prohibit the imposition of initiation fees such as became outstanding scandals during the war years. They prohibit the reprehensible practice of featherbedding which requires an employer, as the price of peace, to submit to extortion in the guise of services which are not performed or not to be performed.

None of these prohibitions are hardships on unions that have a wholesome respect for the other fellow, but they are anathema to the union whose only means of survival has been the use of force against an employer to whom normal means of defense were being denied.

Not only has Congress said that these acts on the part of labor organizations are beyond the Pale, but as to certain of them which are predicated on strikes, inciting to strike, or refusals to perform certain required duties, it has decreed that such conduct must be stopped as soon as it becomes the subject of a complaint. It has mandated the Board, through the General Counsel, to go into the United States District Court and petition for an injunction restraining the continuance of such conduct whenever a charge is filed alleging the commission of such prescribed acts. The General Counsel has no discretion if, on investigating the charge, he has reasonable cause to believe that the facts are true, and that a complaint should issue. He must go forward with the injunction proceedings forthwith, if the case is one that is within the jurisdiction of the Board.

Within the space of this article I cannot discuss all the features of the Act, even were I capable of doing so, but four phases of the Act have been the source of many questions, and to these I wish to give attention. In doing so I call upon the remarks of the General Counsel offered in recent addresses, for his strategic position offers more than our Regional Office affords in giving an appropriate exposition.

I refer to features of (1) injunctive powers, (2) processing jurisdictional disputes, (3) justifiable discharge for cause, and (4) the meaning of collective bargaining under the Act:

1. Injunctive powers

Perhaps the most far-reaching feature of the Act is the broad power given the General Counsel to seek an injunction within his discretion, and the United States District Court to grant it, in *any* case where an unfair labor practice has been charged against either an employer or a labor organization and a complaint has issued. The Act does not attempt to define an area within which this discretion may be used, but the very nature of the provision seems to fix its limitation.

Few persons will argue that labor relations can be regulated by injunction, any more than that labor contracts can be written by legislation.

To balance off the mandatory provision for injunction, the Congress has provided, in Section 10 (j) of the Act, that the Board—and I may say that by virtue of delegation, as well as by the language of the law, this means the General Counsel—may petition for an injunction in any case where an unfair labor practice has been engaged in, whether it be by a labor organization or an employer, if a charge has been filed and a complaint has been issued on the charge. The law truly cuts both ways, and against any who offends against the unfair labor practice provisions of the Act.

At this stage, however, we wish to emphasize that these discretionary injunctions are regarded in the Office of the General Counsel with the highest conceivable degree of respect. They represent one of the most powerful weapons existing under our system of government. It is our feeling that when Congress passed that authority to this agency, it intended that the power be used most sparingly and only in those cases where the principle involved was so glaring, or when the segment of the people involved was so large, that the acts sought to be enjoined could properly be regarded as endangering the public welfare in a substantial way. In short, it is not our idea that Congress ever intended this authority to be utilized in matters involving local disputes ordinarily to be handled in the regular course of the Board's proceedings. The Taft-Hartley Act is not a weapon placed in the hands of employers to abuse labor organizations. It is a medium for curtailing and restraining abuses of employers and employees and the public by labor organizations, and also a medium for restraining abuses of employees and labor organizations by employers as well.

2. *Processing jurisdictional disputes*

The subject of jurisdictional disputes is also covered, as you know. The procedure is designed to provide a forum where the dispute immediately in hand can be decided with reasonable promptness by the Board if the parties themselves are unable to do so. These cases are predicated on charges that a labor organization has caused a strike or has encouraged the employees to strike or to do the other things that provide the primary basis of the mandatory injunction proceedings, as a means of forcing an employer to assign work to employees in one labor organization or trade rather than to those in another labor organization or trade. When such a charge is filed, the Regional Director, after satisfying himself that a dispute of that character actually exists, serves a notice on the disputants which, in effect, is a notice that if they do not settle it between themselves within ten days, a hearing will be held by the Board at a designated place and time, to which they are summoned to appear, prepared to set out their respective positions in the dispute. This hearing may be conducted before a Trial Examiner of the Board or before some member of the staff designated by the General Counsel. The hearing officer makes no findings, but he does make for the Board an analysis of the facts as he finds them in the record. The Board then makes an examination of the record and arrives at a decision as to which of the two disputants is entitled to have the work. Of course, it is expected that this decision will settle the dispute on that particular job, but if the disputants should refuse to accept the findings of the Board, then a complaint issues against the one who has so refused, and the matter goes to hearing before a Trial Examiner as would any other unfair labor practice case. In the meantime, if the dispute persists and the work continues to be held up, the General Counsel may, in his discretion, petition the

United States District Court for an order restraining such interference.

A great number of jurisdictional strikes are being settled without necessity of formal action, and prevalence of such strikes is declining. Facts are persuasive that these disputes can best be adjusted by parent unions and, under provisions of the new act, a growing number of parent unions are assuming this responsibility. The building-trades department of the American Federation of Labor, working with National Associations of General Contractors, has reached agreement in principle on a plan of Nation-wide application which holds promise of solving the great majority of such disputes without recourse to the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board.

3. *Justifiable discharge for cause*

Another provision which has caused some considerable amount of comment is that which emphasizes discharges "for cause". That provision neither adds to nor takes away from the law in any respect. Good cause has always been justification for a discharge and it always should be, regardless of the employee's union activities. I doubt that any conscientious union representative or union member would quarrel with the proposition that any employee, whether an active union member or officer or not, would richly deserve to be discharged if he habitually flouted the regulations of the plant, or destroyed property through willfulness or carelessness, or did other things of similar character which made him objectionable or undesirable as an employee. The "good cause", however, must be real. It could hardly be said, where a number of persons have been caught violating some rule or regulation and have not been disciplined, that it would be justifiable to discharge a union leader for doing the same thing. Good cause is a question of fact. It must be real and not a subterfuge. That has been the rule of the Board ever since I can remember. The difficulty has been in determining whether the circumstances represent good cause or a subterfuge. In my opinion, this provision of the Act does nothing except set up a warning to the Board and to the General Counsel to give full consideration to the circumstances surrounding a discharge when it is said to be based on good cause, and not to let the mere fact that a man may be active in the union outweigh his actual conduct, in arriving at a decision.

4. *Collective bargaining*

The feature, however, which in my opinion is the heart of the Act is that which deals with the process of collective bargaining. The Act contains a definition of collective bargaining. I have heard many persons—most of whom should have known better—say that this definition takes all the force out of collective bargaining and sets up in its place a farcical process that is meaningless. Nothing could be further from the truth. Congress was deadly in earnest when it passed this Act, and it was deadly in earnest when it announced that "it is the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions

to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions, when they have occurred, by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." With this unequivocal statement before us, there can be small doubt that the process of collective bargaining was intended by Congress to operate seriously, and toward the end of removing obstructions to the free flow of commerce. It would be fantastic to attribute to Congress any idea of scuttling the process.

In the definition the cogent words are "in good faith." Two people cannot meet and confer with respect to a mutual problem with their objective the solution of that problem and an agreement concerning it, and have any hope of meeting an agreement unless they approach the bargaining table "in good faith." To be sure, the definition states that the obligation to bargain does not *compel* either party to agree to a proposal or *require* him to make a concession, but that is not inconsistent with bargaining in good faith.

The purpose of this law is to encourage employers and their employees, through their bargaining representatives, to arrive at working agreements covering wages, hours, rates of pay, and other conditions of employment. You cannot normally expect to do this without bargaining. It is inevitable that as the negotiators approach the bargaining table, they will have objectives usually quite distant from each other. If they come into the bargaining conference in good faith, they know that concessions and changes of position are inevitable if the objective of the negotiations—that is, an agreement—is to be accomplished. And they should know, too, that if there is an agreement either in whole or on the major part of the questions involved, there is an obligation on the part of the parties to reduce it to writing and to sign it, if either of the parties so desires.

Collective bargaining today is just as much collective bargaining as it ever was; the only thing is that both parties are required to act in total good faith. It is not a process of making a demand—listening patiently, and saying "no." The obligations are mutual, and both must honestly strive to accomplish a meeting of minds if any meaning is to be given to the fundamental purpose of this law. If either party fails in this duty, the Act provides that such failure is an unfair labor practice and subject to remedial action by the Board.

• • •

I have referred previously to the officer known as the General Counsel. That office is occupied by Robert N. Denham, who, among other distinctions in a colorful career, was once a cowboy on the plains of Texas. His office is the central and strategic one created by the Act. It is filled by Presidential appointment and is wholly independent of the Board. He has charge of all personnel in the field and in Washington except the attorneys who work directly with the Board members.

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He acts with finality in the determination of whether a charge of an unfair labor practice is to be prosecuted and on what theory it is to be prosecuted.

As soon as the Act had been passed and the General Counsel had been selected, the Members of the Board, recognizing the Congressional intent that their functions henceforth must be confined to the judicial area of activities, voluntarily conveyed to the General Counsel by formal delegation, practically all the authority theretofore exercised by the Board and not vested in the General Counsel by specific language of the Act, which was outside the jurisdictional functions. It was a complete cleavage of jurisdiction, and an absolute separation of the judicial from the prosecution side. They delegated to the General Counsel the business of conducting all investigations, hearings, and elections, and the making of original decisions in matters pertaining to representation, reserving to themselves only the right to hear and decide appeals in representation matters on which the Office of the General Counsel had acted; and they delegated to the General Counsel, full and final supervision and direction of all the administrative functions of the agency, so that now perhaps eighty per cent of the personnel and activities of the agency, as well as the final disposition of all unfair labor practice matters up to the point of litigating them before a trial examiner, rests in the General Counsel exclusively. In this way, the criticism that the Board is a combination of prosecutor, jury, and judge, has been extinguished, and the Board takes its position as a purely quasi-judicial tribunal having no other functions or duties than to decide the cases that come to it through the independent office of the General Counsel.

The General Counsel is considerably more than a law officer and, unlike most General Counsels, he not only does not act as a legal advisor to the Board, he is barred from so doing. For legal counsel, the Board must look to its own Solicitor.

As I have stated, it is the duty of the General Counsel to determine whether a charge has merit and when he has determined that an unfair labor practice has been committed, to issue a complaint, and, if it is indicated, to proceed in the District Court to obtain the injunctions that are authorized by the law. His decisions in these regards are final, except of course that sometimes the courts do not agree with him as to whether an injunction is indicated, and then the court's decision becomes final.

One source of tension in our current national life is found in the field of labor-management relations. The tension need not be there, but it is there.

Here we need light, not heat; thought, full consideration, and patriotic calm. In the present scene one's outlook for industrial peace may be blurred by controversies in legislative halls, by editorials not always given

to objectivity, and by sidewalk philosophers whose views of labor relations are born of intolerance and misunderstanding.

The fact remains that more than 60,000,000 of our people are at work producing goods at a rate and volume never before achieved in any peacetime era; 16,000,000 of these workers are working under 50,000 union contracts arrived at by collective bargaining.

More than 500 companies have profit-sharing with their employees as a going factor, and hundreds more have retirement plans beyond that provided in the Government's social security program. In the electrical industry the contractors and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, through collective bargaining, have established a progressive security and retirement plan which may well be a pattern for every other industry.

In the Hormel Packing Company, the men's clothing industry, and in other enterprises the annual wage is a permanent institution, arrived at through evolution of the collective bargaining process.

Bonus plans are increasing in numbers. Cost-of-living adjustment in wages is an accepted principle, and health and welfare provisions are finding their way into negotiated labor contracts.

The City of Toledo has found a way to industrial peace, and a labor dispute becomes a matter of intelligent study and subsequent fair solution in the public interest.

Employers have appeared at their own request before the Senate and House labor and welfare committees to defend the institution of collective bargaining as a factor in the stabilization of employer and employee relationships and of the economy.

The picture of industrial relationships is not, therefore, a completely blurred one, nor is remedy wholly lacking. The death of Democracy, like the death of Mark Twain, has been "greatly exaggerated."

There are few problems in employer and employee relationships that fail of solution when decent men, in good faith, bargain together.

The sins of omission and commission lie in both the house of labor and in the house of management and virtues are likewise found in both. Labor and management alike must develop a statesmanship and a public interest which will lead both groups to be intolerant of incompetent and wholly self-interested constituents in their respective ranks.

Somehow each group must know that in the other there are motives and aims not altogether of self-interest.

Management does not always have as aim the highest profit. There are non-profit incentives, *i.e.*, the desire to keep a business solvent, the desire for security, the desire for prestige and power, the desire for self-expression, enjoyment in the competitive game, and the desire for good will.

Labor is not always seeking the picket line. It wants most of all dignity and respect. Those in the ranks of labor want jobs, fair wages, reasonable

hours of labor and decent working conditions; they want protection against the hazards of their jobs; they want an annual wage; they want to share in the common life of the community; they want recognition of their organization, and they want to bargain with their employers.

I am among those who think that fair-minded workers and fair-minded employers, possibly more than any other two groups, can lead the way to the kind of America we want and the world expects. It is in industry that democracy must have its genesis, and the survival of democracy rests there.

In my years of experience with labor and management groups, I have come to know of their basic human decency. In decent industrial labor relations both groups know that peace rests upon freedom, not restraint; upon equality, not subservience; upon cooperation, not domination; upon mutual respect for freedom of thought and for the worth of the individual. I know they have more in common than not. The interests and wants of the two, where intelligently expressed and unselfishly considered, converge and are not in conflict, and the public interest is served.

These interests common to labor, management, and the public, are best served through the institution of collective bargaining. The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 preserves and protects this institution.

United States Commitments to UNESCO and Federal Control of Education

ANTONIO GARCIA

North Texas State Teachers College

One of the most important specialized agencies of the United Nations is the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Its purpose, as stated in Article I of its Constitution, is "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture." The United States has taken the lead in the task of effectuating the purposes of this organization, and if this international leadership is to be meaningful it must be reenforced with real action and tangible results in educational, scientific, and cultural circles at home.

"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." This sentence from the preamble of UNESCO's constitution tells us at once that the success of the organization depends entirely upon the internationalization of ideas; in fact, the creation of an "international climate of ideas" is the goal which UNESCO has set for itself. While it is not to be denied that changes in people's ideas take place in every phase of modern cultural development, it may be accepted that the public school is one of the major controlling factors of American public opinion. More Americans attend public schools than do citizens of any other country, and the public schools receive by far the majority of the nation's students. Thus if American ideas are to be internationalized the public school must be a major instrument in that process.

But the question of *who* will "construct in the minds" of Americans is often violently disputed. For decades the issue of federal control versus state or local control of public education has been heatedly debated, and many are confused by the proposition of "federal aid without federal control." Nevertheless the influence of Washington, both direct and indirect, continues to grow in this last stronghold of local autonomy. At present public interest in the question, intensified by the debates of the 80th Congress, is at an all-time high. But, to date, all arguments for or against federal action in public education are based on relations between the states and the federal government. This article approaches this so-called domestic question from the international viewpoint for two principal reasons: (1) the writer feels that the principles on which UNESCO is based are sound, the difficulties of effectuating them notwithstanding, and (2) the program of UNESCO must be effective nationally if it is to have any effect whatsoever on the problems of world peace.

Does the internationalization of American ideas mean the nationalization of our system of public schools? Perhaps not, but there is no doubt

that there must be national unison in our attack upon the problems which are presented for solution by UNESCO. Anything to the contrary will make our UNESCO commitments nothing more than empty words. This is not particularly disturbing until we ponder the fact that empty-word commitments, on the part of the United States as well as of many other nations, were the principal stumbling blocks in the path of success for the League of Nations and similar international organizations with their subsidiary agencies. It will not suffice to declare that we believe something ought to be done; the accepted principles must be put into action, and it does not require very deep study to conclude that nations whose educational systems are already nationally-directed will find it easier to put into effect their commitments to this international organization.

Just what is an international commitment under UNESCO and how serious is the matter of our being able to meet it? It is not a treaty—but neither is the famous Potsdam Agreement, which now belabors our State department, a treaty. A commitment under UNESCO is, practically speaking, an executive or “gentleman’s” agreement; this technique of handling foreign affairs, circumventing Senate ratification of treaties, has long been an important tool in our executive’s diplomatic kit. The difference here is that the President delegates his authority and does not adorn the negotiations with his presence or the agreements with his personal signature.

The program of UNESCO, like that of the UN itself, is the result of conferences and discussions between representatives of sovereign governments. It is made effective by recommendations, resolutions, and conventions upon which the representatives agree. And none of these agreements have any meaning within the boundaries of any nation which refuses to accept them. Well then, so what? Why pay any attention to the matter? Cannot our government do as it pleases? Unfortunately it is not quite that simple. If one believes in international law, he believes that international recommendations, resolutions, and conventions must be observed, and he knows that international law contains no sanction except the disapproval of the “family of nations” toward the nation which misbehaves.

Recent history has seen men tried and hanged for violations of international law. America’s best lawyers, including a member of the Supreme Court of the United States, have participated in and have directed these trials and our government has given them its full sanction and support. The recommendations, resolutions, and conventions agreed upon in UNESCO are accepted with just as much solemnity and dignity by the member nations as are the agreements having to do with the international law of war or peace, and certainly the proposals of UNESCO, with their positive and progressive approach to educational, scientific, and cultural matters, deserve the same support as proposals having to do with the castigation of international aggressors and murderers. At this point it

is well to remember that "Member States," as national sovereignties, are the ones who collaborate within the structure of UNESCO. When the representatives of the United States speak in UNESCO they speak for the President, through the Department of State; any commitments made by them commit the nation as a whole. Whether or not these commitments are to be more than mere verbal exchanges of pious sentimentality depends on whether or not the Department of State has at its disposal, and is willing to use, the instrumentalities with which to unify, or, in a considerable measure, to nationalize our educational system in its approach to the problem of world peace.

The program of UNESCO includes such projects as mass eradication of illiteracy, the teaching of the world's leading philosophies and how they may be lived without causing wars, instruction concerning the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies, the internationalization of concepts regarding historical, economic, and political forces, and the international standardization of textbooks and teaching materials. The following resolution of the Second General Conference of UNESCO, held in Mexico City in November, 1947, is especially significant:

The Director-General is instructed to: Prepare for consideration at the 1948 conference a draft convention under the terms of which the Member States may agree, within the limitations and powers of their respective constitutional and legal provisions regarding the control and administration of education, to direct the programmes of their respective educational systems at all levels to the end of international peace and security.

This is but one of many resolutions made by UNESCO which have far-reaching implications upon our public schools. While the reservation with regard to "constitutional and legal provisions regarding the control and administration of education" is quite obvious, it is also obvious that if the reservation is accepted literally the United States may as well abstain from ratifying the proposed convention when it reaches its final form. And the position of leadership of the United States is such that abstention or opposition would be tantamount to destruction of the convention—so far as its effectiveness is concerned.

There are two possible ways in which we can meet our commitments to UNESCO, that is, two ways in which we can use the public school system to internationalize American ideas. The first (and this is not the order of the writer's preference) is national control of the education system, with the consequent centralization of authority in Washington, the diminution of local autonomy in school matters, and the additional tax burden of maintaining a national administrative system for our schools. The easiest way to achieve this end is without doubt the introduction of the grant-in-aid system on a broader scale than it has heretofore been used. "Giving" aid which is subject to certain minimum standards of achievement and regulation is now one of the most effective methods

employed by the Federal government to enter the field of "State" powers. While Americans are seemingly allergic to federal control of their lives, they are quite susceptible to having their own dollars matched with federal dollars in a program which appears to give something for nothing. It is reasonably certain that direct control of education by the national government will not come for some time in the United States, but the extent of indirect control is quite unpredictable. To say that the stopping point is not yet in sight is an understatement of the situation, because our momentum in that direction is rapidly increasing, the Republican Congress notwithstanding.

The second manner in which we may meet our commitments is by expanding the facilities offered by the National Commission on UNESCO and using them more effectively than they have heretofore been used. We enter this part of our discussion somewhat apologetically, because the story we are about to present is about an organization which, although philosophically sound, is structurally very weak for the task which it has been assigned. It is hoped that by pointing out these weaknesses we may arouse interest in their elimination.

The Commission was brought into being on July 30, 1946, by an act of Congress. Its purpose is to advise the Department of State on UNESCO matters, and to act as a liaison agency between UNESCO and American educational, cultural, and scientific organizations which desire to strengthen the United Nations in its effort to secure peace for the world. The advisory function of the Commission is something new in the development of foreign policy, wherein control has traditionally rested exclusively in the executive or executive-legislative branches of the government. However, it should not be inferred that the National Commission may bypass the foreign office. It has no powers, or legal entity, except through the Department of State. According to its chairman, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, President of Kansas State Agricultural College, "it advises officials and conference delegates who are governmentally appointed and governmentally responsible. But it speaks its own mind publicly."

There is no doubt that the National Commission, due to its comparative infancy, has not had an adequate opportunity to develop fully and to show what it can do. It has served the nation well in its approximately two years of existence. At the same time there is little question that federal grants-in-aid or other types of federal control would have produced far greater results if they had been in existence for the same period. The National Commission on UNESCO has had to rely on the voluntary action of schools and organizations which have cooperated with it. Traditionally isolationist America has not volunteered for the task with the fervor which it would display if "volunteering" were recompensed with dollars or sanctioned by coercive legislation.

It is a hard fact that every educational institution which takes part in the program of UNESCO is going to have to add something to its curriculum and activities which will require additional expenditures of time, money, and labor. But if our international commitments are to be met without further centralization of our educational system they must be met by the existing administrative machinery. The local school units are going to have to work more closely with the National Commission, and they are going to be forced to take the initiative. Our history shows only too well that where reform has been needed and local agencies have not taken action, Washington has stepped in to do the job.

Only a small number of our states have made moves to bring UNESCO into their public school systems, and only Kansas has achieved a working organization which may be used somewhat effectively. Although much work is being done in this direction, as yet there are few accomplishments. One of the chief reasons for this is that the work is now being done by individuals and organizations with an interest in this matter but with no practical organization for the coordination of their efforts. There is no means by which to make the UNESCO program effective on a state-wide basis, and further, no means of making it effective nationally except by conferences called by the Commission and attended voluntarily by interested parties at their own expense. There should be a constantly available avenue of contact between the National Commission and the local or state units which control education.

The National Commission is neither organized or financed to carry on direct negotiations with local UNESCO councils, which themselves have no legal status or legal relationship to the Commission. The work of the Commission has been, in fact and in law, liaison between the people of the United States and the State Department. Except for appeals and invitations extended by the Commission all activity must arise within the groups themselves. And except for materials prepared by the State Department and given to the Commission for distribution, the Commission is not prepared or financed to send out needed printed matter to assist the local UNESCO units in carrying out their work.

Although local efforts and funds may be ample to carry out the work of local units as they see it, they must be supplemented regularly with detailed studies of the activities and recommendations of the National Commission. Only in this manner may practicable plans be implemented for effectuating at the local level the commitments made internationally by our State Department. If this is done there will be little likelihood of the initial forward impetus of local volunteer organizations dying out due to lack of a definite program to be completed. The facilities with which the Commission can be of direct and continuous assistance to local UNESCO units must be strengthened if it is to fulfill its mission properly. And this strengthening can be achieved without further federal legislation

on the subject if the local educational units will take the initiative and support the Commission both morally and financially.

Despite the fact that the Commission is legally very susceptible to the manipulations of the State Department, it has been allowed to initiate its own policies. And the Department has accepted these policies as its own. Yet members of the Commission do not regard themselves as members of the State Department. They consider themselves to be private citizens doing their duty in helping to achieve the ideal of world peace through understanding. They receive no pay for their services except travel pay and *per diem* while on official business. The way is clear for making the Commission as much the servant of the people as it is now a servant of the State Department. In brief, the connection between the Commission and the average citizen of the United States must be made stronger than it is at present.

We must internationalize American ideas *now* for it is now that the future of UNESCO, as well as that of the UN itself, is being decided. To achieve this goal requires national efficacy; it cannot be done by isolated local units of our cultural institutions. And to deny that our commitments to UNESCO should be met is equal to a denial of the basis of international law and of the merits of the UN and its specialized agencies. If we accomplish this task without further encroachment in the field of public education by the federal government, we must do it by supporting the National Commission on UNESCO and by strengthening its relations with our public schools. The initiative must come from the public schools themselves and from those who wish to maintain local autonomy in school matters. The alternatives are two: (1) our international commitments in UNESCO will be ignored as not having any moral or material obligation, for the nation will not be able to meet them; or (2) the commitments will be met by direct or indirect federal action which will take the initiative and control out of the hands of local educational institutions in another important phase of public education. Whether the latter alternative is good or bad is a moot question; the former alternative is certainly to be shunned. It appears obvious, however, that those who fear greater federal influence in our public schools should take the initiative at once to accomplish this monumental task in international educational collaboration with the available administrative machinery.

The task must be done, and if the states do not do it Washington will undoubtedly step forward to do it—as it has been done in other cases of needed action or reform. It offers another point from which local and state autonomy in school matters may be further diminished.

Comparison of the Educational Attainments of Rural and Urban Populations of the Southwest

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The West South Central Division of the United States, comprising the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, is predominantly rural. The rural population of the Division makes up 60.2 per cent of the total number of people living in the area. Only two other census divisions in the United States have a higher percentage of their population classed as rural. These divisions are the East South Central with a rural population of 70.6 per cent and the South Atlantic with a rural population of 61.2 per cent of their total number of inhabitants.

The rural population of our nation produces a disproportionately large share of the children; therefore, the West South Central Census Division is responsible for the education of more of the future citizens of our nation in proportion to its total number of inhabitants, than is true of the rest of the United States, with the exception of the East South Central and the South Atlantic Divisions. The educational attainments of the population of the West South Central Division are, therefore, of concern to the entire nation.

This study is designed to provide information on the education of the rural population of the West South Central Division in terms of school grade advancement as compared with that of the urban population of the area. The material of the study is compiled from *The Sixteenth Census of the United States; 1940*. The quality of educational opportunities afforded rural and urban populations is not considered since that very important subject is not a part of the census data.

POPULATION ANALYSIS OF THE WEST SOUTH CENTRAL DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES

Within the West South Central Division of the United States great variations are to be found in the populations of the various states. Texas with 45.5 per cent of its population classed as urban stands as the least rural state in the division. Arkansas with an urban population of 22.2 per cent is the most rural. It can be seen at a glance that the proportion of the urban population of Texas is more than twice that of Arkansas. Louisiana and Oklahoma have urban populations of 41.5 and 37.6 per cent respectively. The variations among the states with respect to the rural-nonfarm populations are not so great as are those of the urban or of the rural-farm populations. Oklahoma with 22.7 per cent of its population classed as rural-nonfarm stands highest in this respect, with Louisiana, Texas and Arkansas following in order with 22.5, 21.1 and 20.8 per cent of their populations so classified. As can be seen by Table I the West South Central Division as a whole has its population divided as

follows: urban 39.8 per cent; rural nonfarm 21.6; and rural-farm 38.6 per cent. The urban population is only slightly higher, (1.2 per cent) than the rural-farm population of the division.

When one notices the age distribution among the residential groups of the division he sees significant differences. Of the population of school age, five through nineteen years, 44.6 per cent are to be found in the rural-farm residential group, whereas the urban population contributes only 34.0 per cent of that age group. In other words, the proportion of children of school age in the rural-farm population is almost 30 percent (27.8) higher than that of the urban group. On the other hand the urban adult population, 20 years of age and above, is 26.9 per cent higher than that of the rural-farm group. (43.9 and 34.6 per cent for the urban and rural-farm groups respectively.

Significant differences in the racial composition of the population of the four states comprising the census division are to be noted. Louisiana has the largest percentage of nonwhite residents with 36.0 per cent so classified; Arkansas stands second with a colored population of 24.8 per cent; Texas with 14.5 per cent stands third and Oklahoma with 9.9 per cent has the lowest percentage of its population colored. The nonwhite population of the states, with the exception of Oklahoma, is almost entirely composed of Negroes. Oklahoma has an Indian population which is about three per cent of its total number of inhabitants. The Negro population of Oklahoma is but slightly more than seven per cent of the total of the state. The percentage of the population classed as Negro in Louisiana is about five times as high as that in the state of Oklahoma.

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTS OF THE ADULT POPULATION

One way of comparing the educational attainments of urban and rural populations is to note the highest grade in school successfully passed by the adult members of the groups under consideration. One will notice by an examination of Table II that a larger proportion of the rural-farm and of the rural non-farm populations has not completed one grade of school (is completely illiterate) than is true of the urban populations. That condition is consistently true for the white and the nonwhite populations. On the other hand if the number who have completed four years or more of college is considered one finds that the proportion of the urban population which has reached that level is more than six times as high as that of the rural-farm population and more than fifty per cent higher than that of the rural-nonfarm residential group. This conclusion holds true if the figures for males, females, white and nonwhite populations are considered. If the percentage of the population which has completed four years of high school or more is considered one finds that 32.2 per cent of the total urban adults, 21.0 per cent of the rural-nonfarm and 9.0 per cent of the rural-farm dwellers, 25 years of age and more, have reached an educational level equivalent to that of high school graduation or above. If the figures are refined to include only the white

TABLE I—DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION OF THE FOUR SOUTHWESTERN STATES BY RESIDENCE, AGE AND RACE

	All Ages		Ages 5 - 19		Ages 20 and Over	
	Number	Per-Cent	Number	Per-Cent of Total	Number	Per-Cent of Total
Total	13,064,525	100.0	3,885,325	100.0	7,956,065	100.0
White	10,569,596	80.9	3,107,385	80.0	6,488,045	81.5
Nonwhite	2,494,929	19.1	777,940	20.0	1,468,020	18.5
Urban	5,203,401	39.8	1,318,113	34.0	3,488,416	43.9
White	4,274,136	32.7	1,077,897	27.8	2,866,718	36.1
Nonwhite	929,265	7.1	240,216	6.2	621,698	7.8
Rural-nonfarm	2,823,807	21.6	833,277	21.4	1,708,570	21.5
White	2,390,889	18.3	704,316	18.1	1,448,231	18.2
Nonwhite	432,918	3.3	128,961	3.3	260,339	3.3
Rural-farm	5,037,317	38.6	1,733,935	44.6	2,759,079	34.6
White	3,904,571	29.9	1,325,172	34.1	2,173,096	27.3
Nonwhite	1,132,746	8.7	408,763	10.5	585,983	7.3

Source: *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, "Population,"* Vol. II, Table 7, Parts 3, 5 and 6, pp. 335-338, 797-800, and 765-768, and "Population," Second Series, Arkansas, Table 7, pp. 13-16.

adults, the percentages of the population which have completed high school are 37.1, 23.9 and 10.7 per cent for the urban, the rural-nonfarm and the rural-farm populations respectively. Thus the proportion of urban adults who have completed high school is more than three times that of the rural-farm adults.

The rural adults, especially the rural-farm adults are at a serious disadvantage in comparison with the urban adult members of the population from the viewpoint of formal education.

COMPARISON OF THE SCHOOL ATTENDANCE OF RURAL AND URBAN CHILDREN OF SCHOOL AGE

The conventional educational pattern of the United States is for the child to enter the first grade in school at the age of six years and to advance one grade each year thereafter until he completes his twelve-grade high school course at the age of seventeen years. The boy or girl who does not enter school at the expected age, even though he attends school regularly after he enters and advances one grade each year, is behind the conventional expectations for his age and is not so far advanced in school when he reaches the time in life when he considers leaving school to seek employment.

An examination of Table III reveals that a larger percentage of rural children delay their entrance into school than is the case in the urban residential group. More than one-half of the rural-farm and almost half of the rural-nonfarm white children six years of age are not enrolled in school, but only slightly more than two out of five of the urban children of that age and race are not in school. Thus the urban children start their educational program at a younger age than do their rural neighbors.

After passing the age of six years most of the rural and urban children are enrolled in school, but at all ages from seven through thirteen years the percentage of children not enrolled in school is materially higher among the rural than the urban groups. The percentage of non-attendance in school of the rural-farm group of the ages seven through thirteen years is about double that of the urban group for both white and nonwhite populations at corresponding ages. One may draw the general conclusion that rural children of the division tend to enter school at a more advanced age than do the urban children and a smaller percentage of rural than of urban children of all ages are enrolled in school.

The fact that children enter school at a more advanced age than that of the conventional pattern, coupled with the apparent irregular school attendance may well be causal factors for loss of interest in school work and advancement on the part of these children which results in school retardation and their withdrawal from school before their completion of the public educational program.

TABLE II — POPULATION OF FOUR SOUTHWESTERN STATES 25 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER,
NUMBER OF SCHOOL YEARS COMPLETED BY RESIDENCE AND RACE

	Urban		Rural-nonfarm		Rural-farm	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Years School Completed						
Persons 25 and Over	2,464,456	100.0	1,239,813	100.0	1,853,213	100.0
No School	79,600	3.2	59,126	4.8	106,052	5.7
Grade School						
1 - 4	197,662	8.0	145,537	11.7	300,291	16.2
5 - 6	253,203	10.3	168,694	13.6	346,749	18.7
7 - 8	533,261	21.6	306,088	24.7	558,782	30.2
High School						
1 - 3	462,882	18.8	249,741	20.1	327,945	17.7
4	492,474	20.0	157,218	12.7	118,282	6.4
College						
1 - 3	242,743	9.9	83,240	6.7	58,314	3.2
4 and over	179,941	7.3	55,903	4.5	21,506	1.1
Not reported	22,690	0.9	14,266	1.2	15,292	0.8
Persons 25 and Over	535,496	100.0	221,164	100.0	485,659	100.0
No School	45,913	8.6	32,186	14.6	78,190	16.1
Grade School						
1 - 4	141,360	26.4	77,300	35.0	195,957	40.4
5 - 6	120,403	22.5	47,688	21.6	105,190	21.7
7 - 8	110,558	20.7	33,184	15.0	64,327	13.2
High School						
1 - 3	58,585	10.9	16,319	7.4	24,954	5.1
4	28,015	5.2	5,181	2.3	5,724	1.2
College						
1 - 3	13,732	2.5	3,369	1.5	4,095	0.8
4 and Over	10,202	1.9	2,398	1.0	1,602	0.3
Not Reported	6,728	1.3	3,539	1.6	5,620	1.2

Source: *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, "Population," Vol. II, Parts 3, 5 and 6, Table 13 pp. 349, 811 and 779, and "Population," Second Series, Arkansas, p. 27, Table 13.*

TABLE III—POPULATION OF SCHOOL AGE OF FOUR SOUTHWESTERN STATES NOT ENROLLED IN SCHOOL
BY RESIDENCE, AGE AND RACE

Age	Urban			Rural-nonfarm			Rural Farm			130
	Total School Age	Not Enrolled Number	Percent	Total School Age	Not Enrolled Number	Percent	Total School Age	Not Enrolled Number	Percent	
White Children										
6	62,032	26,657	43.0	46,305	23,110	49.7	85,320	42,762	50.1	
7	62,653	4,892	7.8	45,565	3,967	8.7	82,842	10,040	12.1	
8	67,300	2,780	4.1	47,991	2,477	5.2	87,355	7,045	8.1	
9	67,979	2,107	3.0	46,799	1,927	4.1	84,996	5,722	6.7	
10	70,806	2,150	3.0	48,400	1,835	3.8	90,533	5,887	6.5	
11	68,291	2,033	3.0	46,022	1,745	3.8	84,849	5,362	6.3	
12	72,412	2,434	3.4	48,288	2,246	4.7	92,152	6,633	7.2	
13	72,763	3,137	4.3	48,066	2,769	5.8	90,939	7,891	8.7	
14	74,258	5,362	7.2	47,570	4,370	9.2	94,135	11,980	12.7	
15	74,282	9,573	12.9	47,170	7,554	16.0	92,154	19,590	21.3	
16	76,474	17,742	23.2	46,730	12,324	26.4	93,552	31,866	34.1	
17	75,158	28,783	38.3	43,998	18,349	41.7	87,902	43,423	49.4	
18	84,697	51,392	60.7	47,627	30,246	63.5	90,180	61,749	68.5	
19	83,034	61,772	74.4	44,734	35,006	78.3	78,348	63,723	81.3	
20	81,912	68,523	83.7	42,825	37,689	88.0	73,164	65,565	89.6	
Non White Children										
6	14,453	4,958	34.3	9,081	3,574	39.4	29,236	13,490	46.1	
7	14,478	1,243	8.6	8,976	1,096	12.2	28,272	4,997	17.7	
8	15,241	781	5.1	9,027	711	7.9	28,438	3,479	12.2	
9	14,858	563	3.8	8,306	574	6.9	26,193	2,607	10.0	
10	16,155	586	3.6	8,988	529	5.9	28,777	2,745	9.5	
11	14,648	526	3.6	7,996	467	5.8	24,753	2,216	9.0	
12	16,624	738	4.4	8,937	582	6.5	28,756	2,847	9.9	
13	16,532	867	5.2	8,680	737	8.5	28,985	3,354	11.6	
14	17,058	1,514	8.9	8,584	991	11.5	27,656	4,187	15.1	
15	16,811	2,904	17.3	8,370	1,785	21.3	26,820	6,370	23.8	
16	17,154	5,450	31.8	8,535	3,117	36.5	27,092	10,281	37.9	
17	16,804	8,622	51.3	8,056	4,502	55.9	25,391	14,235	56.1	
18	18,286	13,038	71.3	8,874	6,651	74.9	27,407	20,214	73.8	
19	16,942	14,191	83.8	7,702	6,630	86.1	22,182	18,720	84.4	
20	18,047	16,589	91.9	8,452	7,807	92.4	23,941	22,026	92.0	

Source: *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, "Population,"* Vol. IV, Parts 2 and 4, Tables 17 and 18, pp. 137-149, 909-923, 131-147, 538-565.

COMPARISON OF THE SCHOOL PROGRESS OF RURAL AND
URBAN POPULATIONS OF SCHOOL AGE

A larger proportion of rural children of school age are not enrolled in school than is true of urban children; thus one would expect the school progress of the rural children would not equal that of the urban group of the same age. Table IV gives data on the relative school progress of rural and urban children who are enrolled in school. The child seven years of age who entered school at the expected age of six years should, if he progressed at the expected rate, have passed the first grade. Children at other ages should make corresponding grade progress. One may be somewhat surprised to note by Table IV that the white rural-farm children, even though entering school at a more advanced age and apparently, from the census reports, not attending school as regularly as do the urban children, have a higher rate of school progress at the ages of seven, eight, and nine years than is true of urban or of the rural-nonfarm children. At the ages above nine years the urban children progress in school at a higher rate than is characteristically true of the rural children. The urban nonwhite children progress at a higher rate than the rural-farm children of that racial group at all age levels.

When the school progress of the rural and urban children is examined for each state of the census division some interesting variations appear. In all the states except Texas the rate of school progress of the rural-farm children, with few exceptions, is not so high as that of the urban group of the same age and race. The rate of school progress of all white children in Texas, especially of the urban residential group, is much lower than that prevailing in the other states of the division. For example, where 80.8 per cent of the rural-farm white children seven years of age in Oklahoma, who are enrolled in school, have passed the first grade, only 70.7 per cent of such children of Texas have made similar progress; where 83.7 per cent of the seven year old white urban children of Arkansas have completed the first grade, only 66.9 per cent of such children in Texas have reached this educational level. In Texas the rate of school progress of white urban children is lower than that of the rural-farm white children through the ages of seven, eight and nine years. The number of children in Texas at all ages is greater than the total number in the other three states of the census division. The school progress pattern of the census division, therefore, more nearly conforms to that of the State of Texas than to that any of the other states.

One may well inquire why the white children of Texas fail to progress at a rate equal to that of the other states of the division. The census data from which the information is drawn gives no positive answer to this question. One may suggest that the Mexican population in Texas may be an important factor. In the 1930 census the Mexican population was listed under the heading of "other races." At that time it made up 99.6 per cent of the total of "other races" of the state. The Mexican

TABLE IV—COMPARISON OF SCHOOL PROGRESS OF CHILDREN IN FOUR SOUTHWESTERN STATES BY RESIDENCE, AGE AND RACE

Age	Grade Completed In School	Urban			Rural-nonfarm			Rural-farm		
		Number of Children:		Per-Cent Passed	Number of Children:		Per-Cent Passed	Number of Children:		Per-Cent Passed
		Attending School	Passed Expected Grade		Attending School	Passed Expected Grade		Attending School	Passed Expected Grade	
WHITE CHILDREN										
7	First	57,761	41,435	71.7	41,598	29,771	71.6	72,802	56,393	77.5
8	Second	64,520	36,729	56.9	45,514	25,283	55.5	80,310	48,117	59.9
9	Third	66,052	34,766	52.6	44,962	22,461	50.0	79,274	42,020	53.0
10	Fourth	68,656	33,840	49.3	46,565	21,153	45.4	84,646	39,789	47.0
11	Fifth	66,258	31,540	47.6	44,277	19,075	43.1	79,487	33,533	42.2
12	Sixth	69,978	32,080	45.8	46,042	18,578	40.4	85,719	33,794	39.4
13	Seventh	69,626	32,547	46.7	45,297	19,181	42.3	85,048	31,877	37.5
NONWHITE CHILDREN										
7	First	13,235	9,580	72.3	7,880	5,542	70.3	23,275	16,442	70.6
8	Second	14,460	7,304	50.1	8,316	3,413	41.0	24,959	9,619	38.5
9	Third	14,295	5,913	41.4	7,732	2,369	30.6	23,586	6,469	27.4
10	Fourth	15,569	5,537	35.6	8,459	2,082	24.6	26,032	5,215	20.0
11	Fifth	14,122	4,569	32.4	7,529	1,564	20.8	22,537	3,682	16.3
12	Sixth	15,886	4,623	29.1	8,355	1,467	17.6	25,909	3,253	12.6
13	Seventh	15,665	4,199	26.8	7,943	1,219	15.3	25,631	2,648	10.3

Source: *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940*, "Population," Vol. IV, Parts 2 and 4, Table 17, pp. 139-141, 907-913, 131-137, and 538-544.

population was concentrated in the urban residential groups to a much greater extent than was true of either the rural-nonfarm or the rural-farm residential groups. In the 1940 census the Mexican population is included in the white population and there is no way of separating it in the census figures from the native white population of the state so far as school attendance is concerned. Since the Mexican children have serious handicaps in school as compared with the children of native white parentage one may conclude that they are likely to fail to progress educationally at a rate equal to that of the native white children. Their lack of equal progress would lower the rate of school progress of the entire group of white school children in that state.

As the children grow older one may notice that the rate of school progress of the urban children is increasingly greater than that of the rural groups. At the age of thirteen years 46.7 per cent of the urban and 37.5 per cent of the rural-farm children have completed the seventh grade. In other words, the rate of progress of the white urban children thirteen years of age is about twenty-five per cent higher than is true of the rural-farm children of the same age and race. If the rate of school progress of the white rural-farm children thirteen years of age is compared with that of the urban group of the state of Texas and of the division excluding Texas, one finds that the rate of progress of the urban group is 21.8 per cent higher among the Texas children and 33.7 per cent higher among the children of the other three states than that of the rural-farm group of that age and race.

Among the nonwhite children the rate of school progress of the urban group is consistently higher than that of the rural-farm group at all ages. At thirteen years of age more than one in four of the urban children, enrolled in school, have passed the seventh grade, but only one in ten of the rural-farm nonwhite educables have progressed in school to that extent.

Another way of comparing the school progress of rural children with that of the urban is by determining the extent of retardation in school of the children in the residential groups. A child eight years old who has not completed the first grade; a ten-year old child who is still in or below the third grade; a child of thirteen years of age who has not completed the sixth grade; and other boys and girls of corresponding ages and grades may be regarded as retarded one or more grades.

Table V gives a comparison of the retardation in school of rural and urban children. At every age level beyond the age of eight years the retardation rate of the rural population is higher for the white educables than is true of the urban children of similar age. At the age of thirteen years the rate of retardation among the rural-farm white children is more than 30 per cent higher than that of the urban group of the same age and race. Among the nonwhite groups the difference in the rate of school retardation of the rural and urban populations is greater than

TABLE V—PERCENTAGE OF RETARDATION ONE OR MORE GRADES OF CHILDREN IN FOUR SOUTHWESTERN STATES WHO ARE ENROLLED IN SCHOOL BY RESIDENCE AGE AND RACE

Ages	Urban Retarded Pupils		Rural-nonfarm Retarded Pupils		Rural-Farm Retarded Pupils	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
White Children						
8	3,598	5.6	2,792	6.1	4,102	5.1
9	8,710	13.2	6,762	15.1	11,172	14.1
10	13,043	19.0	10,133	21.8	18,198	21.5
11	14,422	21.8	11,230	25.4	20,829	26.2
12	16,918	24.2	13,943	30.3	27,340	31.9
13	18,134	26.0	16,373	36.1	28,900	34.0
Nonwhite Children						
8	1,453	10.1	1,111	13.4	3,527	14.1
9	3,475	24.3	2,640	34.1	9,198	39.0
10	5,265	33.8	4,004	47.3	13,723	52.7
11	5,648	40.0	4,161	55.3	14,065	65.0
12	7,395	46.6	5,172	62.0	18,133	70.0
13	7,919	50.6	5,171	72.5	19,766	77.1

Source: *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940*, "Population" Vol. IV, Parts 2 and 4 Table 17, pp. 139-141, 907-913, 131-137, 538-544.

that existing in the white racial population. At each age level above eight years and through thirteen years the rate of retardation of the rural-farm nonwhite children is more than 50 per cent higher than that of the urban population of the same age and race.

Again it may be noted that the rate of retardation of white school children, urban, rural-nonfarm and rural-farm, in Texas is the highest of any of the four states. This fact is especially apparent among the urban children of the state. As a consequence of the high rate of urban school retardation in Texas in comparison with that of the other states of the division, the difference in the rate of retardation of school children of the rural and urban residential groups is not so great as that of the other states. For example, at the age of twelve years the rural-farm white children of Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Arkansas are respectively 43.5, 77.2, and 95.2 per cent more retarded than are the urban children of those states; in Texas the rural-farm white children have a rate of retardation only 15.4 per cent higher than that of the urban children of that age.

COMPARISON OF THE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTS OF THE WHITE AND THE NONWHITE POPULATIONS

If one crosses the racial lines and considers the educational attainments of the white and the nonwhite populations, he finds that the nonwhite are at a disadvantage educationally compared with the white race at almost all age levels and within all the residential groups. The nearest

approach to equality in educational attainments between the two races is found if one compares the urban nonwhite with the rural-farm white residential groups. Even here, however, the nonwhite population is not equal to the white members at most age levels. If one compares the educational attainments of adults 25 years of age and above he finds that whereas 8.6 percent of the urban nonwhite population has not completed one grade of school, only 5.7 per cent of the white rural-farm population is at that low educational level. On the other hand a slightly higher percentage of urban nonwhite residents has completed four years or more of college than is true of the rural-farm white population—1.9 per cent of the urban nonwhite as compared with 1.1 per cent of the rural-farm white group.

When one compares the school enrollment of the white and the non-white races he finds that at the age of six years a larger percentage of the nonwhite children are enrolled in school in all residential groups than is true of the corresponding age and group of white children. That condition is not true at any other age however. The school enrollment of the urban nonwhite racial group is higher at all age levels up to 17 years than is that of the rural-farm white group.

The census figures indicate that the nonwhite children do not succeed in school as well as the white children of comparable age in any of the residential groups. A smaller proportion of the non-white children are at the expected grade level for their age than is true of the white children of the same age, and the rate of retardation of the nonwhite children is higher than that of the white group of comparable age in all residential groups.

CONCLUSION

The urban population at all ages and of each racial group has a higher educational attainment level than is characteristic of the rural population.

The rural-farm adult population of the census division has 70.8 per cent of its white members with less than a high school education as compared with 43.1 per cent of the urban residents with that low educational background. The need for greater emphasis on public school education in the rural districts of the census division seems to be acute. The rural-farm children enter school with a handicap owing to the low educational level of their parents. The family is still a very important educational institution. This is especially true in the rural home. When the family is composed of illiterate or near-illiterate adults the only chance the children then have to secure the necessary education for life in modern society rests with the schools.

The rural-farm population of our nation is the seed-bed from which arises a disproportionate number of the citizens of tomorrow. It seems obvious, therefore, that the future well-being of our nation requires that

the educational facilities and opportunities available to the rural population should at least equal that of any residential group. One seems justified in stating that the present differences to be found between the educational attainments of urban and rural children of school age of the West South Central Census Division should be cause for national concern, not of merely local interest.

Accounting and Industrial Morale

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At first glance one may wonder what connection there can be, if any, between accounting, which deals with values in terms of dollars, and morale, which deals with all the vicissitudes, vagaries, and manipulations of human behavior. Perhaps a better title would be "Accounting for Better Industrial Morale."

Accountants, and teachers of accounting in particular, should be interested in the adequacy of accounting records and procedures from the point of view of managerial effectiveness; however, the degree to which effectiveness can be achieved in any business enterprise depends to a large extent upon the whole-hearted cooperation of employees from the lowest operative level to the highest level of management.

It may be well at the outset to define the terms, accounting and morale. While definitions of accounting are as numerous as there are texts and treatises on the subject, the following examples of authorities reveal the general agreement.

1. According to Perry Mason, of the University of California, accounting is a body of doctrines and techniques by means of which most of the information is provided for the guidance of economic or business activity.

2. A. W. Johnson, of Syracuse University, states that accounting is a collection, compilation, and systematic recording of business transactions; the preparation of financial reports; the analysis of these reports as tools of management.

3. "Accounting is the art of recording, classifying and summarizing in a significant manner, and in terms of money, transactions and events which are in part of a financial character; and interpreting the results thereof." This definition was given by the American Institute of Accountants, Bulletin No. 9. (May, 1941)

Without question, it is agreed that accounting data as revealed through accounts and analyzed through reports are an indispensable tool of management. It is also true that as an establishment grows, management has to depend more and more on accounting records and reports as a basis for making sound decisions and for formulating business policies.

Morale, on the other hand, is a more illusive term. Morale is an intangible force but ever present in any situation where people have to work together. It is a term more difficult to define; but here are a few definitions that will suffice for the purpose of our discussion:

1. R. C. Davis, of the Ohio State University, states that morale is a mental condition which leads individuals and groups willingly to subordinate their personal objectives, temporarily and within reason, to

further the successful achievement of the company's service objectives. It is the spirit that induces employees willingly to accept and execute directions, to conform cheerfully to reasonable discipline, and to give their best efforts without the pressure of authority. Morale is a psychic quality in organization. It may exist in any degree from the completely negative to the completely positive. Good morale, although difficult to develop, maintain, and control, because of its intangible nature, is a prerequisite to business success.

2. William Spriegel, of Northwestern University, states that morale is an intangible force that enables a group to achieve the unexpected when marshalled in behalf of a specific goal. Morale is not a thing to be sought in itself; rather it is a by-product of satisfactory group relationships.

3. In the Industrial Relations Handbook morale is defined as the deep-rooted feeling of loyalty to the company—plants in which morale is the highest usually have the best labor relations and the least interference with production.

It can be seen from these definitions that morale is an integral business factor in any enterprise where people have to work together. Every business establishment must forever aspire toward better morale if it is to operate effectively.

For a period of about ten years we were wrestling with a national economy that seemed to be out of gear; and all the compensatory spending in the form of PWA, WPA, CCC, RFC, and other New Deal techniques was to little avail. We tried cutting the gold content of the dollar, and we tried compensation for not raising hogs; we plowed under crops instead of harvesting them. Still our economy did not respond. It took a national emergency such as World War II to put our economy into high gear. We achieved results which would have been unbelievable theretofore. No doubt if John Maynard Keynes were still alive, he would contend that our high national production proves his theory. He would say that we did not do enough compensatory spending prior to the war. That may be true but on the other hand, we have to keep in mind that every individual was bent on winning the war and industrial morale was at its highest. High morale was responsible for a great part of our national production which rose to the staggering figure of 187 billion dollars, about twice as much as we thought was possible. However, the war is over and the emergency is no more. Loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the cause of winning the war, as morale builders and production incentives, have to be supplanted by loyalty to the firm. If the high rate of production is to be maintained and if costs are to be brought down by greater production, manufacturing establishments must sell themselves and their products to their employees in a continuous process from the time a prospective employee applies for a job to the time he

is ready to retire. The loyalty of employees must be gained and retained through a well integrated public and industrial relations program.

An industrial relations program generally includes the following differentiated activities depending on the size of the establishment: (1) Employment procedures; (2) Health and Safety program; (3) Training and Educational policies; (4) Benefits and Services such as (a) Insurance, (b) Retirement plans, (c) Vacations, (d) Cafeterias, (e) Recreation, (f) Housing; (5) Transfers and Promotions; (6) Wages and Wage policies; (7) Unionization; (8) Personnel Records; (9) Personnel Research.

The effectiveness of the industrial relations program must be measured by two concomitant factors, result and the *cost incurred* to achieve the result. It is obvious that industrial relations activities which will be permanent are those which can justify their cost; and it is natural to expect that the men and women in charge of industrial relations who will succeed best in defending and extending their good work in their respective industries are the ones who know the *cost* of their own several personnel activities and who can compare them from year to year and perhaps relate them to results in at least a general way. Thus it behooves business concerns to know their own costs in respect to organized industrial relations activities as a means toward building better morale among employees within their respective establishments.

That many firms fail to recognize the importance of morale as a business factor was revealed by an industrial relations survey of Louisiana manufacturing establishments made by the author¹. The survey was made on a state-wide basis, covering 114 manufacturing establishments that employed on the average one hundred or more workers. It may be mentioned that the results of this survey correlate very highly with similar studies made in other parts of the country. It can be safely assumed that the conditions revealed by the survey are typical of those that can be found all over the country. Here are some of the findings:

Out of twenty-four establishments which operated employee cafeterias, only five establishments had cost figures available either actual or estimated. There were ninety establishments of one hundred or more employees that provided no eating facilities for their employees.

Athletic activities were quite popular among employees of Louisiana industrial establishments. Thirty-five of the 114 establishments included in the study sponsored athletic activities—baseball, basketball, or bowling—but only ten firms knew what their costs were.

As part of the hiring procedure, forty-seven establishments gave physical examinations to new employees. Twenty-eight of the forty-seven establishments had their examinations made by outside physicians on a fee basis. Under those circumstances, the cost could be estimated if

¹Penz, A. J. *Survey of Industrial Relations in Louisiana*, Doctoral Dissertation, the Ohio State University, 1947.

labor turnover records were kept; but the nineteen establishments which had a staff physician and a dispensary, maintained no separate accounts to determine the cost of their health program.

Out of the 114 firms studied, seventy-three carried group life insurance for their employees; but only twenty-seven were able to determine what their various employee insurance costs were.

Of the twenty-seven establishments which knew their costs of insurance, the range was from a low of \$2 per year per employee to a high of \$46.50 per year per employee. This wide range further accentuates the impression that insurance programs seemed to be established arbitrarily rather than from the point of view of sound industrial relations with an aim toward higher morale.

In summary, the data of this survey revealed that very few establishments of one hundred employees or more handled industrial relations in an organized manner. Of those establishments which had differentiated personnel activities, relatively few knew what the cost of the program was.

One of the soundest ways of creating an advantage for Southern industry in competition is doubtless the achievement of minimum industrial friction in advance of other sections of the country. The more concerns that realize this the better. The practical way of achieving this objective is through accounts and knowledge of costs. The measurement of costs may even promote greater appreciation of the intangible human values involved in the endeavor to achieve higher morale and greater production. However, to achieve these values at any cost may be nothing more than a reckless venture. On the other hand to stint on industrial relations activities may be overlooking a sound investment.

Accountants should not advocate pride in costs but knowledge of costs and attention to costs. Such attention will lead to the best and soundest progress toward mutual understanding between employer and employee, resulting in higher morale and greater production.

Furthermore while the need for more accurate and more uniform accounting methods is stressed for those firms which already have the differentiated personnel activities, it is quite possible that more consideration of costs may suggest to some concerns which do not now conduct personnel activities in an organized way, that the organized way may in fact be the less expensive.

If enough attention can be focused on cost records for industrial relations activities, it is quite possible that further research may establish a normal expenditure for harmonious industrial relations; then all concerns could key their expenditures for this item to that normal closely or remotely, but with a better sense of proportion. A normal industrial relations cost would be assumed, just as power costs are assumed to be normal when amounting to about five percent of operating costs, and advertising when about two percent of sales.

In summarizing it may be stated that morale is a basic business factor upon which the successful operation of a business enterprise depends. Much can be gained through high morale as revealed by the high rate of production during the war effort. The national emergency as a morale builder has to be supplanted by management's effort to sell the firm and its product to its employees through a sound industrial relations program.

The effectiveness of the industrial relations program can only be measured by the result and the cost of achieving the result. More accurate and complete cost data should be developed in connection with each phase of industrial relations to focus attention on its effectiveness and to encourage more industrial relations activities in an organized form.

Suggestions for Clarifying the Concept of Personal Disorganization

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Textbooks in the field known variously as Social Problems, Social Pathology, Social Adjustment, Social Deviation and Social Disorganization have been second only in number to those in Introductory Sociology and have at least equalled the latter in their diversity of approaches to the subject. In spite of this diversity, practically all of them have declared in their prefatory remarks an intention to integrate the presentation of the divers problems through a system of sociological interpretation. But since, in the most recent texts, the authors or their editors are still declaring their intention to integrate their material by sociological interpretation, we may presume (unless we harbor the unkind thought that the declarations are simple rationalizations for entering the textbook market) that the earlier attempts were unsuccessful. Examples of these declarations are legion; three will suffice here.

S. A. Queen and D. A. Mann stated in 1925 that:¹

Our own purpose is to take certain difficult human situations as they appear on the surface, analyze them into their constituent elements and discuss their significance primarily from the standpoint of sociology. . . . We undertake to correlate several viewpoints and techniques, but our emphasis throughout is upon sociological interpretation. In so doing, we run the risk of producing another hodge-podge. . .

In spite of this early statement and others which followed it, Mabel Elliott and Francis Merrill were still impressed with the need for integration in 1933. In the preface of their original text they point out:²

. . . there has seldom been any attempt to integrate the subject matter within a scheme of systematic sociology. . . . *Social Disorganization* . . . is an attempt to study these problems from the standpoint of the social processes which bring them about.

By 1941 they had not changed their opinion; the preface to the revised edition states that the new work is simply "a ramification and augmentation of the earlier work."³

E. R. Mowrer, writing an editor's preface to L. Guy Brown's *Social Pathology* in 1942, grants the value of previous text attempts to introduce scientific order (and ardor) into the subject, but concludes:⁴

The conversion of social problems into Pathologies is sound doctrine and cleared the way for a fundamental understanding of social malfunctioning. Unfortunately, however, there was no corresponding clarification of theory. . . . The result was a

¹Queen, S. A. and Mann, D. A.; *Social Pathology*, Crowell, N. Y., 1925, vii-viii.

²Elliott, Mabel and Merrill, Francis A.; *Social Disorganization*; Rev. Ed. Harper and Bros. N. Y., 1941, Pref. to 1st. ed., ix.

³*op. cit.* Pref. to Rev. Ed. viii.

⁴Brown, L. Guy; *Social Pathology*; Crowell, N. Y., 1942 (1947); Pref., vii, viii.

congeries of pathologies collected together from a wide variety of fields without any integrating framework. . . . It is the distinct contribution of this book, then, to present an analysis of the various aspects of personal and social disorganization in terms of a consistent and inter-related framework.

Even if we agree that Brown has accomplished what his editor claims for him, it is a bit discouraging for the sociologist, since Brown insists that to do so the frame of reference must be through Social Psychology⁵.

From the standpoint of one who has his own text yet to prepare, if integration has not been achieved there has certainly developed a general uniformity of approach (apart from the preface intentions) which is discernible in most text efforts since Queen and Mann, referred to above. This uniformity has been achieved chiefly by the attempts to relate pathological situations to sociological theory in terms of the failure of the social system to function effectively and the similar failure of the individual to participate in approved fashion within his social group. These two generalized concepts have necessarily led to more specific statements which are thought to be descriptive of the conditions present in society (*e.g.*, social unadjustment, social maladjustment, social deviation, social disorganization) and in the individual (personal unadjustment, maladjustment, demoralization, disorganization) when pathological situations prevail.

There have thus developed three sets of terminology in Social Pathology: those which designate the unwelcome conditions themselves (*e.g.*, alcoholism, prostitution, unemployment); those which describe the social condition resulting from or producing the situation; and those which describe the corresponding conditions of the individual participant in the pathology.

In textbooks these three conceptual terminologies have generally appeared as a basis for the organization of material; the first has been used to provide chapter headings and the second and third to provide a convenient division of treatment into problems of personal disorganization and problems of social disorganization. No one but the given author seems to know why a particular problem is treated in one of these sections rather than in the other, and indeed most writers admit apologetically that it is a matter of convenience only. The division into personal and social appears to be traditional, which is to say that there is no good reason for it except historical.

That there is awareness of the fallacy of the treatment of the individual and society as a dichotomy has been evident at least since the early writings of Cooley, and text authors in Social Pathology all earnestly assert that no such dichotomy exists. This statement, while it does not prevent them from using a dichotomous organization of material, does lead to an attempt to make clear the relationship between society and

⁵*Ibid.* 12.

the person in terms of problem situations. That is, there has been a rather strenuous effort to combine the second and third types of concepts mentioned above into a continuum, or into a circular relationship symbolizing interdependence and interaction.

It is at this point that difficulties develop in the clarity of concepts. The authors being sociologists, their material dealing with unifying concepts invariably starts off with an attempt to explain social situations in terms of social relationships. Currently this involves the development of the two-sided concept of *social organization and disorganization*. Out of this attempt the dual concept usually appears with some clarity, especially when augmented by other concepts; *social change*, *culture lag*, *consensus*, *culture value*, *social order*, and so on.

The development of the concept of *personal disorganization* has been quite another matter. Striving to avoid the fallacy of dichotomy, striving with equal energy to support the presently popular multiple factor concept of causation, and conscientiously attempting to take into account the ever broadening body of research findings, text authorities have ended up with a concept of personal disorganization which is "fuzzy" to say the least.

This situation would be unfortunate even if there were no attempt at integration of personal behavior with sociological theory. The trend, however, appears to be in the opposite direction and with increasing emphasis upon personal behavior difficulties. There is need, therefore, for a more precise statement of the concept.

But precise statements of theoretical concepts have seldom been a characteristic of sociologists; witness the continuing popularity of the question-begging statement concerning the nature of sociology itself, that "the whole book must be the answer to the question—'What is Sociology?'" Elliott and Merrill, in their deservedly popular text, devote two chapters to the discussion of Social Organization and Disorganization and one to Individual Disorganization without ever coming down to precise statements—or rather with too many precise statements which are not in harmony. For example they start their discussion of Individual Disorganization by saying:⁶

The same dynamic forces which occasion the breakdown of group consensus and produce social disorganization also disorganize the individual. Caught in the maelstrom of social tensions and disruptions, many individuals have lost their perspective, their sense of balance, and their interest in life itself. These disorganized individuals produce further social disorganization in so far as their anti-social or ineffective conduct represents deviations from the norm. Individual and social disorganization operate in a vicious circle. Personal and social disorganization are dual aspects of the same process.

This statement sends quiz conscious students (and their instructor) scurrying back to the chapter on Social Disorganization. Unfortunately

⁶*Op. cit.* p. 61.

there is no italicized statement as to what this phrase means. We are told that it is a relative term; that "social organization and disorganization represent, in a sense, reverse aspects of the same thing"; that, "social disorganization represents a breakdown in the equilibrium of forces, a decay in the social structure, so that old habits and forms of control no longer function effectively."⁷ Combined with the discussion of consensus, social processes, social values and other concepts, however, this is enough. To Elliott and Merrill, social disorganization evidently means loss of consensus, and the resulting confusion and ineffectiveness of social action. Translated into individual terms (since individual and social disorganization are dual aspects of the same thing) personal disorganization becomes a condition of confusion, mental conflict, ineffective and inconsistent behavior, ineffectiveness of old habits of adjustment.

However, this is apparently not all that the authors mean by the concept. They further state:⁸

The individual may believe that his activities are perfectly logical, his choice eminently reasonable, and his particular definition of the situation the best of all possible definitions. But society may think otherwise. . . . The individual who thinks and acts contrary to these group prescriptions is considered immoral, unsocial, imbalanced and disorganized.

. . . . Personal Disorganization is measured by the degree and severity of individual departures from the socially accepted norm. . . . We are all familiar with individuals who have been broken on the wheel of life. . . . With complete disregard for group standards they may work out a life *organization* according to an anti-social pattern. (Italics supplied).

Without clarification this evidently disharmonious view of disorganization—that it refers both to internal inconsistency, imbalance and conflict, and to highly organized but anti-social behavior—is confusing. But no clarification is forthcoming and the term is used to refer to either or both conditions. If we turn to other sources, new or old, we find very little assistance. Queen and Mann seem to have been hardly conscious of the duality of meaning in their use of the concepts of unadjustment, maladjustment and demoralization but apparently accepted the "confusion" meaning in their first two concepts and the "anti-social organization" connotation in their concept of demoralization.⁹ Guy Brown does not even bother to define personal disorganization in his treatment, although he uses it not only in the dual sense described above, but also as a condition not even related to social disorganization.¹⁰ Likewise articles by Fuller, Wirth, Waller, Queen, *et al.* in the periodical literature, seem to miss this particular difficulty.¹¹ Fairchild's *Dictionary of Sociology* is

⁷*Ibid.* p. 26.

⁸*Op. cit.* pp. 76-77.

⁹*Op. cit.* pp. 17 ff.

¹⁰*Op. cit.* Ch. 1.

¹¹*Cf.* Fuller, *Problem of Teaching Social Problems*; *Am. J. Sociol.*, 44; 415 etc.

not much help, since its definition is a summarization by Mabel Elliott of her point of view in the text to which reference has already been made.¹²

Queen, Bodenhafer and Harper came close to a specific statement with their three-fold classification: one use refers to situations in which there is difficulty in fulfilling fundamental desires and is called "a-organized"; a second one is described by the term "counter-organized" when the difficulty involves active conflict with the social order; a third condition, typified by internal conflict with the self, is identified as "disorganized."¹³ However, this careful distinction (which leaves disorganization with its standard dictionary meaning) seems to have been overlooked by later writers and, progress being what it is, we cannot be expected to return to a definition that was put into a footnote back in the dark ages of 1935!

The result, therefore, is that the term personal disorganization as currently used is a generic concept referring to all personal conditions in which there is either an apparent lack of organization within the individual's private world or a degree (from slight to complete) of organization which is at variance with social norms. The concept is used to describe conditions varying from the individual who applauds the church choir's rendition of an anthem to the "hardened" criminal or prostitute; from the vagaries of behavior of the early adolescent to the violent activity of the manic; from the slightly humorous absent-mindedness of the professor to the complete catatonic, brooding in his cell. All of these individual behavior manifestations, and an almost infinite number of other specific types, can be considered as expressions of personal disorganization.

On the other hand the individual who is the soul of honesty but upon viewing his wife's newest hat, tells her it is a charming creation; or the one who votes for prohibition (or to continue the tax on oleomargarine) but bitterly objects to legislation stifling free competition and free enterprise, is considered to be personally organized!

Such a highly generalized connotation may be satisfactory if all that is desired is a term to use as a title for one division of a text, but its very diversity of coverage makes it awkward as a working tool for analytical purposes. Personal disorganization suffers from the same difficulty as did W. I. Thomas' four wishes: they explained so much that they failed to explain anything.

Even as a term used to describe a condition presumed to be a polar opposite to personal organization, personal disorganization is inefficient since the individual is presumably always located at some point on a continuum between organization and disorganization. Since, at the smallest deviation from the norm, or at the appearance of any conflict, organization is lost to that degree, it is as if we used the term Zero to designate

¹²Fairchild, Henry Pratt, ed., *Dictionary of Sociology*; Philosophical Lib., N. Y., 1945.

¹³Queen, Bodenhafer and Harper, *Social Disorganization*, Crowell, N. Y. 1935, 486, footnote.

the entire range of a thermometer except for the topmost degree. Consequently we are forced to use qualifying concepts such as unadjustment, maladjustment and demoralization to indicate degrees of disorganization. If we are going to do this, there really is no point in having the more general term.

Furthermore, research evidence is abundantly clear that disorganization is not a matter of the whole person but rather is applicable only to specific behavior and attitude systems within the person. Consequently to designate a person as disorganized is not a valid statement; what must be done is to identify certain behavior patterns as disorganized. This connotation is not even hinted at in the present interpretation of the concept.

It is more than barely possible that the connative difficulties sketched in the preceding sections are accountable for the fact that there has been no outstanding success in using personal disorganization as a conceptual framework around which to build a sociology of social pathology. As currently used the concept is a statement of an abstract condition and so generalized that it fits vastly more conditions than actually are defined as pathological by the social norms. Yet students, when asked to construct case histories of personally disorganized individuals, have no difficulty at all in picking out those persons in their experience whom they would consider disorganized. They must be using some criterion on which to base their judgement and it is almost certainly not the definition which they have got out of a textbook. The answer is, of course, that they pick highly advanced cases of disorganization, those out on the end of the distribution curve: the suicide, the town drunk, the notorious woman, the "crazy Kates" and so on. While this is satisfactory for illustrative type material it is not adequate for a scientific conception any more than it would be to take only advanced psychoses to fit a definition of mental disorder.

If personal disorganization is to be successfully used as a theoretical tool, it needs to have a more clearly expressed meaning in terms of *process*, such as the term "socialization" has; a concept that has been most useful to the sociologist. As a matter of fact what we now describe as a *condition* is actually described and used as a process and might quite profitably be defined as *a process by which the individual develops certain behavior patterns and attitude systems that, when overtly expressed, are disadjustive within his group relationship*. Since this is essentially the opposite meaning to that of the term socialization, perhaps the term Dissocialization would be more descriptive than our present phraseology.

It is this process of Dissocialization which Guy Brown seems to have in mind when he speaks of the individual at birth being "an unbiased candidate for either organization or disorganization", or when he insists

that the person learns to be abnormal in the same manner that he learns to be normal.¹⁴

The interpretation in terms of process is also helpful in clarifying the apparent inconsistency between personal disorganization of the "confused, conflict" type and the "counter-organized" type. By distinguishing between disorganization as a process and conflict, confusion, loss of consensus and other factors as the mechanisms which are operative in the process, some clarification of meaning should appear.

In this connection it is also helpful to define disorganization in terms of non-conforming behavior related to specific situations and to specific groups. The person identified as disorganized in one situation within one group may be defined, and frequently is, as well organized if he exhibits the same behavior in the same situation but in a different group. In both cases the test is the degree of non-conformity exhibited rather than the nature of the behavior itself. This, of course, is the meaning implied in the concept of social adjustment and unadjustment. Both of these terms are inevitably defined in terms of cultural values so that an understanding of these latter, or a statement of them in a definition, is a final aid to a clear notion of the term disorganization. Simple non-conformity does not always result in a designation of a disorganized condition, nor does inconsistency of behavior. Only that behavior which is considered to be destructive of the particular group's definitions of right and wrong, good and bad, is considered a mark of disorganization.

It would also be well to remember that the group's *standards* of behavior and the actual behavior indulged in by many of its members may be two entirely different things. This has been vividly illustrated in the several research reports concerning sexual behavior, which show rather conclusively that our moral standards of chastity, faithfulness to monogamy, abstinence from auto-eroticism and so on are being violated by a much larger proportion of the population than has heretofore been suspected. In this situation the group, although it will punish offenders who are exposed, practices secretly that which it defines as wrong; each member who shares in this behavior therefore is disorganized to the extent that he experiences conflict with his "conscience", or has "guilt feelings", even though a majority of his associates may be indulging in the same behavior. The sex-sin-guilt complex is an example of this phase of disorganization. The recognition of ideal versus actual behavior promises to be most helpful in analyzing the process of disorganization.

It would seem better, therefore, in presenting a concept of personal disorganization, to give it a process meaning rather than attempting a connotation of a condition which is an abstraction. It would be better to substitute the term Dissocialization to express this process meaning. It would help clarification not to have people "broken on the wheel of

¹⁴*Op cit.* Chapter 2.

life" or "caught in the maelstrom of social tensions" included along with individuals who have achieved a system of behavior which is, to them, satisfactory although contrary to social definitions. It would further seem better to include the notion of maladjustment in the definition in such fashion that it will refer to a specific situation, both behavioral and idealogical.

In fact, it might be better to throw away the whole concept and start over, not with the idea of describing whole areas of social relationships in one all inclusive term (and it taken from a layman's vocabulary) but with the notion of erecting a series of more discrete concepts which will lend themselves to use as analytical tools which, in the field of the social sciences, words have to be if they are going to have more than euphemistic value.

Freedmen and The Oklahoma Lands

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The Oklahoma Lands, in what is now central Oklahoma, were a prospective home for freedmen of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations for more than twenty years following the Civil War. In the early eighties while colored immigrants were establishing colonies in Kansas, Negroes in Illinois and other northern States organized the Freedmens Oklahoma Immigration Association and made an unsuccessful effort to colonize the Oklahoma Lands. The lands were subsequently opened to homesteaders in the Run of '89, a Negro settlement was established at Langston, and the Colored Agricultural and Normal University was located there.

The tract known as the Oklahoma Lands embraced 1,887,800 acres. In reference to present towns, it extended from Stillwater to Norman, from Choctaw to El Reno. It was bounded on the south by the South Canadian River, on the east by the Indian Meridian and the Pawnee reservation, on the north by the Cherokee Outlet, and on the west by the Cimarron River and the ninety-eighth meridian.

Before the Oklahoma Lands were known by that name, the Creeks and Seminoles acquired title to large areas which included these lands. As early as 1833 the United States conveyed to the Creeks a fee simple title to certain lands extending from the Cherokee Outlet to present Oklahoma City.¹ In 1856 the United States did "solemnly guarantee" to the Seminoles a tract of country extending from present Oklahoma City to the South Canadian River.² The North Canadian River separated the Creek and Seminole lands.

The titles of the Creeks and Seminoles remained unimpaired until 1866 when each of the tribes made a treaty with the United States. In compliance with the desire of the United States to locate other Indians and freedmen thereon, the Creeks ceded and conveyed to the United States, to be sold to and used as homes for such other civilized Indians as the United States might choose to settle thereon, the west half of their entire domain which included their portion of the Oklahoma Lands.³ The Seminoles made a similar cession and conveyance, which included their portion of the Oklahoma Lands.⁴

It should be noted that the United States acquired a restricted right, not a complete cession. Reservations for the Pottawatomies and Absentee Shawnees, Kickapoos, Iowas, Sacs and Foxes, Pawnees, Wichitas, and for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were laid out in whole or in part

¹Kappler, *Treaties*, ii, 388.

²*Ibid.*, p. 756.

³*Ibid.*, p. 931.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 910.

on lands ceded and conveyed by the Creeks and Seminoles in 1866. The portion unassigned was called the Oklahoma Lands, Oklahoma country, and eventually the Unassigned Lands.⁴

By a treaty proclaimed on July 10, 1866, the Choctaws and Chickasaws ceded to the United States a tract south of the South Canadian River, west of present Chickasha, known as the Leased District.⁵ The price was \$300,000. Payment of this sum, however, was conditioned on certain steps being taken by the tribes to improve the welfare of the freedmen in these Nations.

If the Choctaws and Chickasaws within a period of two years provided the freedmen with rights, privileges and immunities, including the right of suffrage, and granted each person forty acres of land, then the sum should be divided so that the Choctaws should receive three-fourths and the Chickasaws one-fourth; but it was first necessary to deduct from the \$300,000 enough to allow one hundred dollars for each person of African descent who within ninety days after the passage of such legislation by the Indians should remove himself from the Choctaw and Chickasaw domain. In the meantime the United States should hold the money in trust for the two tribes at an annual interest of five percent.

If such laws were not passed by the Choctaws and Chickasaws within two years, then the sum should cease to be held in trust for these Nations, but should be used by the government for the benefit of the freedmen who were willing that the United States should remove them within ninety days from the domain of the two tribes. Freedmen who should choose to remain with the two tribes or who should return after having been removed were to have no benefit of the sum but should be "upon the same footing as other citizens of the United States in the said nations."

It is not easy to determine the motives for writing this complicated plan into the treaty. It may have been an honest effort to better existing conditions. The population in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations was about 17,000, among whom were about 4,000 freedmen.⁶ Attention centered on the Chickasaw nation which bordered the Oklahoma Lands, and in which the freedmen were nearly as numerous as the Indians.

On November 9, 1866, the Chickasaw legislature passed an act requesting that the United States remove the freedmen from the limits

⁴The Office of Indian Affairs in January 1885 said that the tract was known as "the Oklahoma lands." See *S. Ex. Docs.*, 48 Cong. 2 sess., ii(2263), No. 50, p. 19. To lessen confusion for the reader, I have altered the term to "Oklahoma Lands." It appears that the Oklahoma Lands were a part of the "Oklahoma district."—*Indian Affairs, 1883*, p. lvi. See also Com. Hiram Price to Sec. Int., Feb. 27, 1883, *S. Ex. Docs.*, 48 Cong. 1 sess., iv(2165), No. 51, p. 3.

⁵Kappler, *Treaties*, ii, p. 918.

⁶In regard to deficiencies in the treaty, see the report of S. N. Clark, special agent of the Freedmen's Bureau, Feb. 1, 1870, *S. Ex. Docs.*, 41 Cong. 2 sess., ii(1406), No. 71.

of the Nation as provided in the treaty.⁸ The freedmen expressed a desire to settle in the Leased District or on any land designated by the government.

A council of Choctaw and Chickasaw freedmen on June 10, 1868, a month before the expiration of the two year period, appointed James Squire Wolf, Squire Butler, Isaac Anderson, and Anderson Brown as delegates to confer with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and other officials in regard to the interest of the freedmen. At Boggy Depot on the same day the freedmen in council addressed a petition to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs asking that the delegates be permitted to visit Washington, that action be taken to remove the freedmen from the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, and that the \$300,000 be spent for the use and benefit of the freedmen.⁹

N. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was in favor of the delegates coming to Washington, and he observed that only eighty days remained for the removal of the freedmen as provided for in the treaty. Secretary O. H. Browning said that there was no designation of a place to which such persons should be removed, nor was there any provision made for the cost of removal. He found it necessary to await action by Congress. In August the Choctaws and Chickasaws urged the government to fulfill its pledges and remove the freedmen. Agent Martin W. Chollar observed that the government had "plenty of land west of the Seminole reservation" which could be set apart as homes for the freedmen, and which would be perfectly satisfactory to them.¹⁰ In 1868 the Pottawatomie reservation had not been selected.¹¹ The United States had the right to locate freedmen on the north banks of the South Canadian River, almost the full length of the Chickasaw Nation. The suggestion that they be located there was forthcoming from various sources and was renewed from time to time.

About February 1869 Mahardy Culbert, James Squire Wolf, and Anderson Brown, "Delegates from the Freedmen in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Agency," addressed a memorial to Congress requesting that the \$300,000 specified in the treaty of 1866 be paid to persons of "African descent. . . per capita, so that they may remove from said country."¹² The delegates pointed out that the two year period had lapsed by more

⁸The Choctaws enacted similar legislation. Helpful calendars of events are in *H. Misc. Docs.*, 42 Cong. 2 sess., ii (1525), No. 46; and in *S. Ex. Docs.*, 50 Cong. 1 sess., x (2513), No. 166.

⁹The petition, dated June 10, 1868, is in *S. Ex. Docs.*, 40 Cong. 2 sess., ii (1317), No. 82, pp. 4-5. Of the 45 persons who signed the petition, apparently only one could write his name.

¹⁰*Ind. Aff.*, 1868, p. 280.

¹¹B. B. Chapman, "The Pottawatomie and Absentee Shawnee Reservation," *Chronicles of Okla.*, vol. 24 (Aug. 1946), pp. 293-305.

¹²A delegation of freedmen was in Washington in February 1869. The memorial bears no date, but was referred to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, February 17,

than six months. The petition did not specify a location to which the freedmen would migrate. It said the payment would enable them "to remove and commence life in the country to which they may migrate; thus leaving them entirely free to select their homes outside the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, as other Freedmen are permitted to do."

The petition suggested that the per capita payment be made by the Choctaw and Chickasaw agent under the "direction and supervision of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern Superintendency." Superintendent L. N. Robinson said that the situation and condition of the blacks within the Indian tribes was "a reproach to our boasted civilization and love of justice" so long as the plan of colonization remained untried.¹³

On August 28, 1869, Agent George T. Olmsted called a meeting at Boggy Depot which was attended by over three hundred Negroes and the leading men of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. After an extended discussion the Negroes decided in a body that they would remain in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, if possible, as they preferred being with the people among whom they were raised than among others whom they did not know¹⁴. Olmsted said that the principal and prevailing idea among the Negroes was that they did not want to lose the protection of the federal government, and evidently feared being left solely under the control of the laws of the Nations, or the laws of any State or community where they could not have recourse immediately to the government for its decision on every point that related to their interests. The Choctaws were in favor of the Negroes remaining in their Nation, and the Chickasaws waited for the government to decide on some course in regard to the Negroes.

The effect of the decision at Boggy Depot in 1869 was not overcome, even though the question of removal lingered on for twenty years. In 1870 Olmsted was interested in the removal of the freedmen.¹⁵ He reported that they were not subjected to ill treatment, but that their status remained a "vexed question."

"What is to be done for and with the freedmen?" was a question that caused Agent T. D. Griffith anxious thought in 1871. The freedmen were generally adverse to removal. Griffith suggested that if they were removed, the "country known as the Seminole cession" would be fine for them, and if there they would "be likely to elevate themselves above their present position."¹⁶ The next year he said that the freedmen wanted

1869. It is in the National Archives, Senate, 40A-H 10-H 11, Ind. Aff.,—Judiciary. Unless otherwise specified, manuscript materials cited in this article are in the National Archives.

¹³Robinson to Com. E. S. Parker, Aug. 1, 1869, *Ind. Aff.*, 1869, pp. 399-400.

¹⁴Olmsted to Com. E. S. Parker, Sept. 21, 1869, *ibid.*, pp. 408-409.

¹⁵Same to same, Sept. 15, 1870, *Ind. Aff.*, 1870, pp. 291-292.

¹⁶Griffith to Act. Com. H. R. Clum, Aug. 1871, *Ind. Aff.*, 1871, pp. 570-571.

to remain in the Choctaw and Chickasaw country, "even under all the disadvantages of their present position."¹⁷ The uncertainty of their rights was such that he could not encourage them to make permanent improvements.

The governor of the Chickasaw Nation on January 10, 1873, approved an act to adopt the Negroes of their Nation, and allow each forty acres, on condition that the Nation received its portion of the \$300,000 specified in the treaty of 1866.¹⁸ Congress took no action on the matter. On May 2, 1874, Columbus Delano, Secretary of the Interior, said that neither the Choctaws nor the Chickasaws had secured to the freedmen the rights, privileges, and immunities, including the right of suffrage, provided for in the treaty. The United States had not removed any of the freedmen because they were so identified "by marriage and custom" with the said Nations as to be unwilling to break up their homes and go elsewhere.¹⁹ The \$300,000 had not been invested for nor paid to the Choctaws and Chickasaws.

A decade later Commissioner Hiram Price requested that an appropriation of \$25,000 be made to enable the Secretary of the Interior to settle on the Oklahoma Lands "such persons of African descent, and their descendants," as were mentioned in the treaties made with the Five Civilized Tribes in 1866. According to the request the Secretary, upon application made and proof submitted to his satisfaction that the applicant was entitled thereto, should be authorized to assign 160 acres to each head of a family, eighty acres to each single person over twenty-one years of age, and a like amount to each orphan under that age.²⁰ Secretary H. M. Teller transmitted the letter with his approval to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. On January 14, 1884, a like request was communicated to Congress through the President's office.²¹ But Congress took no action.

In 1887 it was estimated that there were three or four thousand freedmen and colored immigrants in the Chickasaw Nation and it was realized that under existing conditions they would soon outnumber the Chickasaws. To invest the Negroes with the elective franchise was likely to ultimately deprive the Chickasaw people of their government and country. In January G. W. Harkins and H. F. Murray, Chickasaw delegates, addressed a memorial to the President earnestly asking that the United States fulfill the treaty of 1866, by removing without delay to the Leased District, Oklahoma country, or elsewhere all the freedmen

¹⁷Griffith to Com. F. A. Walker, Sept. 2, 1872, *Ind. Aff.*, 1872, p. 238.

¹⁸The act is in *H. Ex. Docs.*, 42 Cong. 3 sess., ix (1867), no. 207.

¹⁹Delano to William A. Buckingham, *S. Misc. Docs.*, 43 Cong. 1 sess., i (1884), no. 118.

²⁰Price to Sec. Int., Feb. 27, 1883, *S. Ex. Docs.*, 48 Cong. 1 sess., iv (1885), no. 51, p. 3.

²¹*Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, viii, 198.

who should consent to removal from the Chickasaw Nation.²² Commissioner J. D. C. Atkins did not see anything that could be done to better the condition of the freedmen, or to carry out the wishes of the Chickasaws, without legislation by Congress.

After the freedmen had been in the Chickasaw Nation a few years they did not like to leave because they had made farms and had become attached to the country. Their attitude was crudely expressed by a group of representatives who met Agent Robert L. Owen and submitted to him the following decision: "The hole Number of men has A Greed to be left in the hands of the united State if the Chickasaw do Not take us."²³ Owen suggested that the portion of the Oklahoma Lands immediately adjacent to the Chickasaw Nation might well be occupied by the freedmen. In his annual report in 1888 he said that they should be removed by the government and placed there.²⁴

Commissioner Atkins recommended that there be submitted to Congress for favorable consideration a bill providing for the removal of such of the Chickasaw freedmen as were willing to emigrate to the Oklahoma Lands.²⁵ The bill provided that the lands upon which they might settle, and which were ceded to the United States "to locate other Indians and freedmen thereon" be allotted to freedmen in quantity as provided in the General Allotment Act, and secured to them by the same title. Such suggestions only indicate who the settlers on the Oklahoma Lands might have been, had that region been destined to become an Ethiopia.

Spectacular and well-publicized invasions of Boomers, led by David L. Payne and William L. Couch, directed attention from efforts made in the early eighties by Negroes of Kansas and other states to colonize the Oklahoma Lands. On March 15, 1881, Hannibal C. Carter said that with a favorable opinion from Wayne MacVeagh, Attorney General of the United States, he would colonize twenty or thirty thousand freedmen on the Creek portion of the Oklahoma Lands "in time to make a crop" that year.²⁶ On the same day James Milton Turner agreed that thousands of freedmen were making preparations to enter the Oklahoma Lands during the early spring months.²⁷ Turner had served as minister resident and consul general to Liberia, 1871-1878. He is said to be the first Negro to serve in the diplomatic corps, and the most outstanding member of his race to be born and raised in Missouri.

²²The memorial is in *S. Ex. Docs.*, 50 Cong. 1 sess., x(2513), no. 166, pp. 10-13.

²³Owen to Atkins, Sept. 17, 1887, *ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

²⁴Report of Aug. 27, 1888, *Ind. Aff.*, 1888, p. 132.

²⁵Atkins to Sec. Int., May 8, 1888, *S. Ex. Docs.*, *Loc. cit.*, pp. 1-7. Secretary William F. Vilas submitted the bill to Congress on May 9.

²⁶Carter to Sen. John A. Logan, OIA (Office of Indian Affairs), L. 5246-1881.

²⁷Turner and Carter to MacVeagh, March 15, 1881, *ibid.* See also Irving Dilliard, "James Milton Turner: A Little Known Benefactor of His People," *The Journal of Negro History*, vol. 34 (Oct. 1934), pp. 372-411; and *Dict. Amer. Biog.*, xix, 66-67.

On April 23, 1881, *The Missouri Republican* referred to the Freedmens Oklahoma Immigration Association as a "new movement." It appears that Turner was president of the association, and Carter was general manager. The association was sending out from Saint Louis a circular addressed "To the Freedmen of the United States," stating that the government had generously anticipated the necessities of the freedmen.²⁸ The circular promised 160 acres in fee simple to every freedman who would go and occupy the public lands of Oklahoma already "surveyed and sectionized, awaiting their intended use." It said that no bar existed to the immediate occupation of the lands by freedmen. The circular contained a letter by Elias Cornelius Boudinot, probably that of March 31, 1879.²⁹ It appears that agents were sent into the southern States to start an emigration movement among the colored people.

The association professed to have made an arrangement to employ from 1,000 to 5,000 laborers for six months, or longer at from one dollar to \$1.50 per day, with board, provided they reached Saint Louis at their own expense.³⁰ Thence they were to be transported without expense to the scene of their labors, on condition that they agreed to join the Oklahoma movement.

Samuel J. Kirkwood, Secretary of the Interior, strongly advised the colored people to await the result of his investigations of the legality of the claims of the association before taking any action. He said: "Should these poor people get into the Territory and find that they had no right to be there, and the army should be used to eject them, there would be much distress."³¹

The matter was brought to the attention of Acting Commissioner Curtis W. Holcomb of the General Land Office who reviewed the circular and emphatically said that there were no lands in the Indian Territory open to settlement or entry by freedmen or by any other persons under

In regard to "the exodus," see Everett Dick, *The Sod-House Frontier, 1854-1890*, pp. 196-198; Robert Taft, "The Pictorial Record of the Old West: III. Henry Worrall," *Kan. Hist. Quart.*, xiv (Aug. 1946), p. 247.

²⁸*The Chicago Daily Tribune*, April 19, 1881, p. 2. The Indian Office received a copy of the circular May 5, 1881, and it was filed in OIA, L. 7468-1881. It is now missing from the file.

²⁹In March 1879 E. C. Boudinot, in urging the opening of the lands to white settlement, made the statement that the treaties of 1866 gave the United States "an absolute and unembarrassed title" to the lands ceded by the Creeks, Seminoles, and the Choctaws and Chickasaws, with the exception of the Pottawatomie, and Sac and Fox reservations. Boudinot to Augustus Albert, *S. Ex. Docs.*, 48 Cong. 2 sess., ii(2263), no. 50, pp. 51-52. The letter imparts better the spirit of the Boomer than the logic of the law. The "plain but accurate map" which Boudinot had prepared showing what he called the public lands in Indian Territory is in *S. Ex. Docs.*, 46 Cong. 1 sess., i(1869), no. 20, facing p. 27.

³⁰*The Chicago Daily Tribune*, loc. cit.

³¹*Ibid.*

the public land laws of the United States since all lands there to which the government had title were permanently appropriated or definitely reserved for certain uses and purposes." He stated that title of the United States to lands in the Territory was subject to specific trusts and that it was not within the lawful power of either the legislative or executive departments of the government to annihilate such trusts, or to avoid the obligations arising thereunder.

Holcomb explained that the freedmen referred to in the Creek and Seminole treaties of 1866 were "the former slaves of Indian tribes. The treaty stipulations, as uniformly understood and construed, have no application to any other freedmen than the persons freed from Indian bondage. They relate exclusively to friendly Indians and to Indian freedmen of other tribes in the Indian Territory whom it was the desire of the United States to provide with permanent homes on the lands ceded for that purpose." The intended beneficiaries, Holcomb stated, could enter only in a manner provided for by law and not by miscellaneous immigrations.

A fortnight later, May 11, 1881, Judge Isaac C. Parker gave the same interpretation of the term "freedmen" stating that they were those "who had been slaves in the Indian Territory, and none others."³² He explained that immediately after the abolition of slavery the government desired to protect the freedmen, and had considered the establishment of a Negro colony in Indian Territory.

The Freedmens Oklahoma Immigration Association received its charter and was duly organized in Chicago on December 15, 1881, under the Not for Profit Act of Illinois.³⁴ The object for which the association was formed was "to unite in bonds of fraternity aid and protection of all acceptable colored persons of good character, steady habits, and reputable calling to improve the condition of its membership materially by securing to them lands and homes in the unoccupied Territories of the United States." Carter said the association was incorporated for the purpose of mutual aid in obtaining homes for freedmen upon the unoccupied lands of the United States in the Indian Territory.³⁵

³²Holcomb to S. J. Kirkwood, April 25, 1881, *S. Ex. Docs.*, 47 Cong. 1 sess., v(1990), no. 111, pp. 2-4.

³³*United States v. Payne*, 8 Fed. 883 (1881). See also Com. Atkins to Sec. Int., March 22, 1886, OIA, *L. Letter Book*, vol. 146, pp. 107-113.

³⁴The Not For Profit Act was approved April 18, 1872. The original Articles of Incorporation, no. 2076, are in the office of the Secretary of State of Illinois. Photostatic copies of the articles and papers concerning the dissolution of the corporation were purchased for this study by the Research Foundation of the Oklahoma A. and M. College, and are in the Oklahoma Historical Society. A search in the Chicago Historical Society, and in the Illinois State Historical Library did not disclose additional information about the Freedmens Oklahoma Immigration Association.

³⁵H. C. Carter and R. M. Mitchell to the President, July 28, 1882, OIA, L. 14395-1882.

The management of the association was vested in a board of five directors to be chosen annually. Persons selected as directors to control and manage the corporation for the first year of its existence were Hannibal C. Carter, Edward Shaw, John E. Carter, James H. Purdy, and Robert M. Mitchell.

In 1882 petitions purporting to be from Negroes living in Kansas and other states were sent to Congress asking to be allowed to settle in the unoccupied lands of Indian Territory, and on June 16 a bill was introduced by Senator Henry W. Blair of New Hampshire for that purpose.³⁶ In a letter of July 5 Commissioner Hiram Price reviewed the status of the lands in Indian Territory in regard to the settlement of Negroes thereon and concluded that the most liberal construction that could be placed on the stipulations in the treaties of 1866 would not, in his opinion, justify such a scheme or procedure as the colonization of the colored people from Kansas and other States or the Territories, on the Oklahoma Lands or on any other lands in the Indian Territory.³⁷ Price said that any action inaugurated to carry such a scheme into effect should receive the prompt and unqualified condemnation of the Department of the Interior.

From Chicago on July 28 the Freedmens Oklahoma Immigration Association sent a petition to the President of the United States, signed by Hannibal C. Carter as president and Mitchell as secretary.³⁸ The petition echoed a legal fallacy popularized by the Boomers. It stated that by the treaties of 1866 the Creeks and Seminoles had "extinguished all their title" to about five million acres in Indian Territory.

The petition also said: "In compliance"—as the treaties expressed it 'with the desire of the United States to locate other Indians and Freedmen thereon,' that the minutes of the Commissioners forming such treaties conclusively show that the term '*Freedmen*', was distinctly understood to mean Freedmen of the Southern States." The petition said that about 1,500,000 acres were used by the United States in the settlement of "'other Indians'" before the abandonment of the policy of settling any more Indians in the said Territory. "The remaining unoccupied lands [are] unclaimed by any Indian tribes. Your petitioners ask [them] to be by Executive order opened to entry and settlement under the homestead and preemption laws, by the Freedmen of the South, in the execution of the specific trust of which they were thus made and intended to be the beneficiaries."

³⁶*Cong. Record*, 47 Cong. 1 sess., p. 4994. Roy Gittinger, *The Formation of the State of Oklahoma* (1939), pp. 149-151.

³⁷Price to Sec. Int., July 5, 1882, *S. Misc. Docs.*, iv (1996), no. 117, pp. 2-5. Price addressed a similar letter to Hannibal C. Carter, Aug. 16, 1882.—OIA, *L. Letter Book*, vol. 100, pp. 234-243. He based his construction largely on *Ind. Aff.*, 1865, pp. 296-353, from which source he determined what freedmen the Indians had in mind when the treaties of 1866 were made.

³⁸H. C. Carter and R. M. Mitchell to the President, *loc. cit.*

The Freedmens Oklahoma Immigration Association, like the Boomers, was obliged to await action by Congress. In the meantime cattlemen let their herds range the Oklahoma Lands. Acts of Congress approved on March 1 and 2, 1889, ratified agreements whereby the Creeks and Seminoles sold all their right, title, and claim to certain country including the Oklahoma Lands.³⁹ Thus the Oklahoma Lands became public lands which the federal government could open to homestead settlement. In the Run on April 22, 1889, and in the subsequent commotion over the acquisition of lands there developed the fixed policy of eliminating the Negroes entirely.⁴⁰ Intense race prejudice of white immigrants and the rule of the mob prevented a larger number of Negroes from settling on the Oklahoma Lands.

In 1890-91 certain homestead entries were commuted to cash, and Langston was founded "as the only exclusively Negro town in America."⁴¹ The Colored Agricultural and Normal University was established there in 1897, and since 1941 has been known as Langston University. The Freedmens Oklahoma Immigration Association failed to file annual reports as required by the law of Illinois. For this reason it was dissolved by action of the Attorney General in the Superior Court of Cook County, March 19, 1920.

³⁹25 Statutes, 757; 1004.

⁴⁰Carter C. Woodson, *A Century of Negro Migration*, pp. 144-145.

⁴¹Register and Receiver of the Guthrie land office to Com. Gen. Land Office, April 7, 1894, Gen. Land Office, Box 163, Langston Townsite Papers.

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Book Reviews

Edited by—H. MALCOLM MACDONALD

JOHN A. LOMAX: *Adventures of a Ballad Hunter*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947, Pp. 302. \$4.50.)

One rainy night in 1871, when he was but four years old and lying abed, John A. Lomax heard the following two lines of a five-line stanza sung by a cowboy.

"It's your misfortune and none of my own,

For you know Wyoming will be your new home."

Two years before, the Lomax family had moved from the Black River section of Mississippi to a farm in Bosque County, Texas, right by one of the branches of the Chisholm Trail. The cowboy had the task on that rainy night of quieting a trail herd of restless cattle. He was crooning stanza after stanza of that well-known song to quiet the cattle and to get them to lie down. "Lay down, little dogies, lay down," one of the stanzas ended.

In all likelihood this song, often heard and often recalled, had much to do with getting Lomax later to collect and have published *Songs of the Cattle Trail and Cow Camp* and *Cowboy Songs*, and *Other Frontier Ballads*. Equally determining as the cowboy's song, perhaps more so, for Lomax was then a mature man with a bachelor's degree from the University of Texas and teaching experience at Weatherford College and Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College, was endorsement in April, 1907, by Professors Barrett Wendell and George L. Kittredge of Harvard University of Lomax's appeal "to the editors of a thousand newspapers in the West" to help him find and collect early pioneer ballads. The "immediate and surprising response to this appeal" was so generous and voluminous that, after two years of hunting cowboy songs, Lomax furnished copy for *Cowboy Songs and Other Frontier Ballads*.

Lomax's work as a ballad hunter falls into two periods. In the summer vacations of 1908, 1909, and 1910 Lomax was hunting cowboy songs. His experiences in this connection are related in the third chapter of his autobiography. The second period began in 1932 when Lomax secured a contract from the Macmillan Company to furnish them copy for *American Ballads and Folk Songs* and asked a year's time to fill in the gaps between ballads which he had secured in the first period of his work and during the next two decades. It was not until June of 1933 that Lomax and his son Alan started out by automobile, loaded with a large Edison dictaphone, to find more ballads. By September first of that year they began to assemble their copy in the Library of Congress and to place there for permanent keeping the records which they had made.

When the work on *American Ballads and Folk Songs* was accomplished, Lomax secured aid from the Carnegie Corporation for one year to continue the work of collecting folk songs which were to be added "to the meager store which then made up the Folksong Archive of the Library of Congress." After that year the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored the work for about another decade. All in all, Lomax and his son added "more than ten thousand songs on records" to the Folksong Archive.

During this second period Lomax traveled very extensively with his son Alan and secured most of the songs and ballads from negroes in state penitentiaries and from untutored and unlettered whites. The negroes, both men and women, sang both spirituals and "sinfuls" for Lomax. Outstanding among the negro convicts who sang for Lomax were Lead Belly, Iron Head, and Clear Rock, all three of them Texas penitentiary inmates, Dobie Red of Mississippi, Allen Prothero of Tennessee, Kelly Pace of Arkansas, and Roscoe McLean of Florida, while Doc Reed and Vera Hall of Livingston, Alabama, neither of whom was a convict, "sang some beautiful spirituals not found in any other community."

Among the white people who were helpful to Lomax during his second collecting trip were James Howard, the singing bard, of near Harlan, Kentucky, Mrs. Ruby Pickens Tartt of Livingston, Alabama, through whose help Lomax made records of three hundred and five folk songs among her negro friends, Mrs. Emma Floyd of Murrell's Inlet, South Carolina, who sang "The Romish Lady," the ninety-three year old unnamed courier of General Jeb Stuart, who sang "The Unreconstructed Rebel," J. M. Hunt, called Sailor Dad by everybody, who sang "Haul Away My Rosey," Captain Pearl R. Nye of Akron, Ohio, "the last of the Ohio Canal Captains," who sang "The Dark-Eyed Canaler," Mrs. Emma Dusenberry of near Mena, Arkansas, in the southern Ozarks, and Mrs. George A. Griffin of the piney woods of North Florida, who sang "The King Wrote a Love Letter." But for John A. Lomax's work these papers might never have been known outside of the small localities in which they lived. They and many others have been made great by Lomax's adventures.

The University of Texas

Rudolph L. Biesele

Integration of the Humanities and The Social Sciences, A Symposium. (Dallas, Southern Methodist University Press, 1948. Pp. 92. \$2.00.)

This is an account of an excellent symposium on the subject of the integration of the humanities and the social sciences; and such contributors as Louis M. Hacker of Columbia University, Henry Nash Smith and Aubrey Castell of the University of Minnesota, and W. F. Dyde of the University of Colorado indicate the excellent quality of the work.

The symposium, held at the Southern Methodist University, November 7th and 8th, 1947, concluded that the integration of the social sciences and the humanities is *desirable* and *possible* because both are vitally interested in humanity itself and the idea that "man as a conscious and social being actually exists and is a central object of concern." Smith showed that a problem exists because many consider that there is a gap between the two disciplines: social science, they say, is interested in seeking precision and "natural" laws while the humanities are interested in "the concrete nature of individuals." Smith stated that the social sciences could profit from an addition of "the subjective aura"; and the writer would add that the humanities could profit from the use of the scientific approach. Smith believes that history, considered as a part of the humanities, can give a needed perspective to the social sciences, which "take too shallow a slice of their subject matter." But one may add, again, that history may be considered a part of the social sciences, too. Perhaps it would be better to consider history one link between the two disciplines. In any event, eventually (why not now) both the humanities and the social sciences may contribute to the understanding of man, and there need be no schism between the two if sincere attempts are made to bridge the gaps.

Considering the differential approach to the study of humanity from another angle, Castell asserted that the social sciences have adopted the "naturalism" of Darwin while humanists consider human beings purposive. Hacker proposed that this gap could be bridged by the study of morals. He said that both social scientists and humanists could agree upon the worth of the individual, the importance of social welfare and equality of opportunity for all men. Practical steps toward integration, at least *within* the two areas that were mentioned are (1) "integrated courses in the social sciences, the humanities and the natural and physical sciences as at Columbia College, Chicago, Harvard, Amherst, Dartmouth," and the University of Colorado, (2) integrated courses in the senior college, (3) integration of subject matter dealing with specific culture areas of the world (Dyde).

The University of Minnesota Program of General Education was outlined in detail. It was shown to be administered by three divisions—those of natural science, social science and humanities. Each division offered courses cutting across departmental lines. Courses taken count toward meeting group requirements for entrance into the senior college.

The practical suggestions in the volume were of a rather general nature. It is to be hoped that the next symposium can devote more emphasis to detailed programs of integration for teachers. This reviewer would also like to suggest that a better balance between humanists and social *scientists* be considered for the next conference and that scholars be instructed to place more emphasis upon integration than upon differences.

Contributors should be selected who can see the viewpoint of both social science and humanities *equally* well.

Colorado State College of Education

Leslie D. Zeleny

WILFRED E. BINKLEY: *The President and Congress*. (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947, Pp. 312.)

Wilfred E. Binkley's *The President and Congress* is a new edition of his *The Powers of the President: Problems of American Democracy* (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1937). The chapter headings remain substantially the same, except for the addition of a chapter on "The Presidency in World War II". The content throughout has been considerably revised, and the new title better expresses the purpose of the author.

Without doubt, *The President and Congress* affords the best brief survey available of what next to our federalism is our most important constitutional problem. In fact, the relationships of the President and Congress might seem to be our greatest problem, for the evolution of our federalism has followed a much more constant pattern. The equilibrium between the executive and legislative branches, which the framers of the Federal Constitution intended to establish, has in truth never been realized. Instead, for 160 years there has gone on a continuous tug-of-war with alternating and temporary victories for each side. Each time, the ascendancy of one or the other has been accomplished with varying methods and techniques. Changing times, new political conditions, the "shifting sands of party politics", and the infinite variety in types of leadership, both presidential and congressional, have served to make each swing of the pendulum a somewhat novel experience.

All this Professor Binkley traces accurately and demonstrates clearly. We are carried through the Federalist efforts to establish a ministry, President Jefferson's subtle wire-pulling as a party leader, the eclipse of the presidency from 1809 to 1829, Jackson's tribunate of the people, a second partial eclipse from Van Buren to Buchanan, Lincoln's "dictatorship", Johnson's "disgrace", the era of "congressional government" from Grant to McKinley, the strong leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson with the faltering Taft between them, the Harding-Coolidge, Hoover period, the heroics of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and, finally, the Truman deadlock. Thus, we have come a long way, but where are we? As the author states: "The experience under the Constitution certainly reveals that the problem of integrating the executive and legislative branches has not yet been solved."

For this dilemma the author has no particular solution. As for the parliamentary system, he points out that whenever transplanted, it "has behaved as an exotic plant". He further adds that "The American constitutional system is just as much a product of our own society and

environment as the parliamentary is of another". He believes, however, that each successive victory of Congress has diminished its prestige. It is necessary, therefore, that Congress improve its own organization if it is to "approximate an effective performance of the significant role assigned it by the Fathers of the Constitution". "Whether this will be accomplished by the LaFollette-Monroney Act," he adds, "remains to be seen." "Congressional government," however, can never be more than a "fair-weather type of government"; "crises government" inevitably means presidential supremacy. Thus, there seems to be little chance of abandoning our traditional system of government by "pull and haul" or by more or less friendly or unfriendly combat—of arresting the operation of the law of the pendulum. Perhaps, after all, there is a degree of safety in such a system which a parliamentary system in the world of today does not provide.

The University of Texas

O. Douglas Weeks

B. F. SKINNER: *Walden Two*. (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948. Pp., 266, \$3.00.)

For only one reason does this book deserve mention in these columns. For this it deserves very thorough consideration. In it the author, an academic man, steps beyond his range of competence to spin a panacea scheme. Perhaps this transgression of Skinner is less grievous than that of Earnest Albert Hooton, who as a scientist a few years ago birthed a book called *Crime and the Man*. Skinner presents *Walden Two* as a novel and, quite judiciously perhaps, omits any note locating his motives in taking up its theme. This very omission of course may allow him to wail, "Misinterpretation!" at any critic, but this omission, too, leaves any assessment free to impute according to the preponderate evidence of the script itself. Accordingly, the author must stand exposed—or write again!

Now Professor Skinner is centrally and morally concerned with the social obligations of a man of social or personal science: what can, what must he do in this age of chaos to create a good society? *Walden Two*, then, might most generously be considered as a tract propagandizing for the accelerated development and integration of social science as a technology aimed directly at the attainment of given values in a world of cataclysmic changes. Admittedly, this summing rests upon considerable imputation. In the first place, Skinner has very little to say, and this depreciatingly, for social science or the social sciences. His word—salaam! salaam!—is psychology, the It which can unify us and point the way of progress toward a Golden Age! In the second place, any reasoning which would intrude the idea of a world upon Skinner at all is crude. In his scheme what would happen to the world must await the extension and then multiplication and extension again of purified cell communities.

A confounding point always and forever before the contemporary social sciences is that every human being is a competent authority on human affairs. Medics like Alexis Carrel! The technocrats! The ismists—every one of them. One can be tolerant of the Leibmans and feel almost playful in ridicule of the shallow presumption of the Dale Carnegies. But, when a man of science, a professional psychologist, proffers patent scientism as a cure, even in a novel, it is clearly time to turn directly to him with another question, not the one he asks, concerning the obligations of his role: how can you, Professor Skinner, as a man of science justify yourself? You don't have to do this since you wrote as a novelist? Consider the evidence of the manuscript! Consider Burriss, the psychologist character, the wit—and convert to *Walden Two*. (Professor Skinner's first name is Burrhus). Consider the poor philosopher, Castle—a mere dupe made to speak as if a John Dewey had never put pen to paper! Dogmatic abuse in a treatise essentially in social ethics of modern ethics! A straw man!

Fictional fascination clearly was not Skinner's end! Paranthetically, while he of course cannot be held responsible for Macmillan's jacket bait, witness this play as if the script is straight:

"Although *Walden Two* now exists only in Mr. Skinner's imagination, you *may* be able to move there some day. . . . It is the kind of a dream that *can* be translated into reality."

What we need is a dynamic and enlightened behavioral engineering. How can we get it? The answer sounds no little like the Mussolini of the trains on time; perhaps here and there somewhat like a Denis Diderot might sound in this century. Says Skinner's advocating character:

"It's a little late to be proving that a behavioral technology is well advanced. How can you deny it? Many of its methods and techniques are really as old as the hills. Look at their frightful misuse in the hands of the Nazis! And what about the techniques of the psychological clinic? What about education? Or religion? Or practical politics? Or advertising and salsemanship? Bring them all together and you have a sort of rule-of-thumb technology of vast power. No, . . . the science is there for the asking. But its techniques and methods are in the wrong hands—they are used for the personal aggrandizement in a competitive world, or, in the case of the psychologist and educator, for futility corrective purposes. My question is, have you the courage to take up and weild the science of behavior for the good of mankind? The fact is we not only *can* control human behavior, we *must*."

Who's to do it? What's to be done?

Skinner assumes a selection of converts (there would be no "actual" criminals taken, nor would physical or psychological charges be admitted) who in return for participation and its advantages would agree to live by the ideology of the Walden Code. Members of the community would be organized into four classes. *The workers*—"solid, trustworthy, es-

sential" (they "don't want to plan. They want to be free of the responsibility of planning. What they ask is merely some assurance that they will be decently provided for")—would be the decent little puppets. *The managers* and *the scientists* would be almost equally ranked specialists—almost since the scientists presumably would take no part in selecting planners. Managers would be selected by the planners from workers experienced in "intermediate" responsibilities; scientists, *applied* scientists of course since pure science is to be leisure time activity, by the planners presumably from citizens who had the perceived touch of inclination. *The planners* would consist of six policy heads, each selected for a single ten year term by the planners themselves from a list of two recommendations submitted by the managers! Skinner's advocate character was not disturbed when the philosopher-dupe suggested fascism! The political problems like the economic problems such planning would immediately entail were of course mere and incidental to Skinner's advocate, something to get through to set up "behavioral engineering"! If one layman reads *Walden Two* with hope, this sociologist hopes he recognizes and then never forgets who moves the puppets! Ain't psychology wonderful?

Behavioral engineering sounds like more than Skinner makes of it. Except under some dire urgency of time, it is difficult to see why what he makes of it had to be inserted in the crude system of social theory indicated above. Its premise is that folkpractice must be viewed experimentally in terms of given social values. Its faith is that when this is done by men of good will (guided of course by psychologists) initial gains will be immediate and sufficient enough to establish the matrix for further progress. The formula for extension is maximum use of technology for group ends. The immediate mechanisms are such devices as careful propagandizing to the community code, an "enlightened" humanism, "what the science of behavior calls 'reinforcement theory'. . .," etc. There are practical thoughts here, but they really appear, it is worth repeating, quite incidental to *Walden Two* as a structure. And, that's the rub.

Stimulating? Yes, *Walden Two* is stimulating. Stimulating in the sense that it forces one committed to scientific values in the social sciences to seek once again to define them! Stimulating in the sense that its politics emphasize the necessity for vigilance in pursuit and support of other ideals! Stimulating in the sense that it makes for thought on the limits between art and license! Stimulating in the sense that it leads to wonder about the mind that produced this book!

Oklahoma A & M College

Paul B. Foreman

GEORGE WARREN (Ed): *The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Administrative Agencies*. (Proceedings of an Institute Conducted by the New York University School of Law on February 1-8, 1947, New York University School of Law, 1947, Pp. 630.)

This volume, says Dean Arthur Vanderbilt in a forward, is offered to the public to help in "explaining an act which otherwise might be misunderstood, particularly in its application to specific agencies." The plan of the volume emphasizes the particular objective. There are relatively brief introductory discussions on the legislative background and the general nature and significance of the act, including a critique of the act and an answer by Frederick F. Blachly and Carl McFarland, respectively. There are also three very useful chapters on rule making, adjudication, and judicial review by David Reich, Ashley Sellers, and John Dickinson, respectively. The remaining 420 pages of the volume comprise fourteen chapters in which the application of the act to as many agencies is analyzed. In each case the basic analysis is given by a person familiar with the work of the agency, usually by a member of its legal staff, and is followed by questions and answers.

The volume confirms the assumption, basic to its publication, that no understanding of the effects of the act is possible without meticulous study of the minutiae of the administrative operations. It reveals also that no clean picture of its effects is possible at this time. On the one hand, many of the speakers at the conference emphasized the similarities between the requirements of the act and the old practices of their agencies and expressed a belief, or indicated a hope, that the act would require no significant changes. On the other hand, some brought out such varied effects as the materially increased workload, the additional formal requirements, or the special problems created by particular provisions. The extent to which an agency's informal methods may place its proceedings outside the purview of the statute is especially revealed in the discussion of the Securities and Exchange Commission (pages 213-252), and the possibility of standing on present procedure until it is shown that the act requires change is exemplified in the statements quoted from Commissioner Aitchison of the Interstate Commerce Commission (page 315). The one overall conclusion which stands out from the volume is that there is much uncertainty as to how much effect the act will have on administration. This is clearly revealed, for example, in John Dickinson's argument that the statute broadens "the scope and measure" of judicial review where administrative action "is reviewable at all" in contrast to the Attorney General's statement to Chairman Sumners of the House Judiciary Committee that the act declares existing law on judicial review (page 581). The uncertainty is revealed, however, on page after page of this volume as the different specialists discuss the applicability of the statute to their agencies.

The book is a real contribution to the student who is trying to measure the effects of the act. It is already, however, only one part of what will be a voluminous literature. The nature of the study of administrative law and practice has for the moment changed. In agencies, in legal literature, and in litigation procedure will be tested against the provisions of a statute. Some will ask: would it have been better to move forward with the development of a "common law" on administrative procedure through the sharing of experience and the adaption of procedure to substantive approach rather than to try to partially "codify" at a midway point? And whatever the answer to this question, many will hope that the study of the administrative process will not be limited to statutory interpretation and application. Much of the administrative process is not standardized by the act; there is still some scope for a free evolutionary process. Moreover, it may yet be true, in spite of the efforts of the draftsman of statutes, that the most useful contribution to the improvement of the administrative process, both as a system of justice and as a system of getting jobs done, may come from a further study of the nature of the administrative process and the requirements for effective administration. Responsibility for this study rests jointly upon the students of administrative law and public administration. The reviewer cannot close this note to social scientists without protesting Carl McFarland's comparison of Dr. Blachly's appearance in these proceedings to the "three elderly maiden ladies" in court without a lawyer. He must express a hope that those trained in the law and those trained in administration may accept each other in an area of study which belongs exclusively to neither.

The University of Texas

Emmette S. Redford

The Motion Picture Industry. (Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November 1947, Pp., 172.)

Whether the movies are leading Mr. Average American straight to perdition or uplifting him by the best acting and music in the world will still be a moot question to the social scientist who foregoes a movie to absorb this interesting series of clashing opinions.

Each advocate of a position bolsters his case with a few facts. The net result is broadening. No one knows the answer to this enigma. Certainly, all will feel a desire to respond to the prayer of one of the writers for audience research "which will hasten the day when the screen is freed from its subservience to the pressures of self-interested groups who falsely claim to represent the public."

Of particular interest is the presentation by Dr. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, professor of sociology and director of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, of a few of the main methods, findings, and problems connected with precisely that type of audience research.

Aside from praising or damning the motion picture, according to their obvious prejudices, or looking detachedly at the industry, the writers do not controvert a few relevant facts: Each week, 235 million people go to 80,000 motion picture theaters. On an investment of slightly more than two billion dollars, the industry in 1946 grossed more than one and one-half billion dollars and netted a profit of eleven per cent. Of this gross income, the United States Government finally received 23 per cent in taxes of all kinds. The annual production of motion pictures in the United States results in from 250 to 350 finished films.

Apparently because objective research on what people really desire from their motion picture industry is still so fragmentary, the industry spokesmen make it quite plain that there will be a continuation of the policy to produce what will sell until concrete evidence is available something else will sell better.

Since freedom in the arena of public opinion involves obligations no less than license, one writer predicts increased public anxiety about the content and the implications of this dramatic, significant, and influential medium. The industry is criticized repeatedly for offering "rarely more than half a dozen times a year any subject other than the glutinous desire of one member of the species for another."

An economist accuses the industry of being a monopoly in all but name, with its members "competing" with one another in somewhat the same way as do the several branches of General Motors Corporation.

Howard Hughes' picture, "The Outlaw," one critic points out, showed exhibitors they can now present pictures lacking a Seal of Approval without fear of being fined, "thereby by-passing the self-regulatory process of whitewashing." Directly controverting that is the statement by the assistant director of the Production Code Administration that "self-regulation is practicable and has brought a satisfactory reaction from the general public."

Today's motion picture is "the people's art," asserts the president of the Motion Picture Association of America. The movies are a stimulus to culture, he thinks, making the best acting in the world available to everyone and helping popularize the classics of literature and music. He rejects as invalid most statements made by "self-appointed critics."

Twenty-five writers present twenty-five sides and views of this argument. All of them are interesting, some significant.

University of Houston

Truman Pouncey

F. STUART CHAPIN: *Experimental Designs in Sociological Research*, (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947, Pp., 206. \$3.00.)

Here is an excellent little handbook for the sociologist who desires to set up experimental studies; or who merely wishes to know what many

of his colleagues are talking about in a large portion of the articles in current sociological journals.

Although the book is written in predominantly non-mathematical language and is therefore easy to read and to understand, the whole argument is for the strict application of the mathematics of statistics to social research. The research projects described were designed for the application of statistical and operational procedures, were so executed, and so interpreted. This leads the author to warn that the results obtained are valid only for the particular data utilized and that no generalizations are warranted, at least not until much corroborative work has been done.

This is, of course, a vain hope and a futile warning. It may even be an excess of caution. In the older sciences, from which the experimentalists draw so heavily and toward which they look so admiringly, a single experiment, correctly designed, gives data which can be, and is, immediately applied to all other specimens of the same sort. The Manhattan Project needed only one experiment, in New Mexico, before using The Bomb in actual warfare; and no one who knew what had happened in New Mexico had very great doubts, I suspect, as to what would happen at Hiroshima.

At any rate, when the potential contributor reads that Minneapolis boys who remain in Boy Scout work attain slightly better personal adjustment, commit fewer crimes; but have a community participation score of only about half that of those who drop out early, he is very likely to look at the next solicitor from a new perspective, whether he lives in Little Rock or Hartford. Nor does it help much to read that the meaning of the experiment depends upon whether the reader believes that personal adjustment is better than community participation so that the "final conclusion is then a matter of judgment."

Three types of experimental design are presented. The cross sectional is the type ordinarily thought of in which an experimental group is tested by variation of one factor against a control group in which presumably all factors remain constant. The other two designs have this characteristic also, but add the time element, either by going backward into the history of the groups or by following them into the future. These are called, respectively, the "projected" and the "ex post facto" designs.

There is an excellent discussion, for the experimentalist viewpoint of the use of historical material, here labeled "natural social experiments by trial and error." There is also a very good discussion of the limitations of the method recommended. But the meat of the book for most readers will be the descriptions of the researches presented under the three type-headings. It is true that practically all of this material is available in the form of articles in journals; but here it is brought together for easy reference and verification by repetition.

The University of Texas

Harry Estill Moore

IAN KUCHARZEWSKI: *The Origins of Modern Russia*. (New York, The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 1948, Pp. 503. \$5.00.)

This book by a distinguished Polish historian is an abridged translation of his seven volume study published in Warsaw in 1923-1935, under the title *Od białego caratu do czerwonego* (From White Tsardom to Red.) A work of great erudition and literary distinction, it presents a challenging interpretation of the Communists revolution in Russia as a natural outgrowth of the whole course of Russian history.

The author's main thesis is stated in his preface in the following terms: centuries of "slavery" have implanted in the minds of the Russian people "the habits of despotism, love for arbitrariness, belief in the necessity of coercion, lack of respect for law and man's freedom, disregard for human individuality." Hence the inevitable transition "from White Tsardom to Red." On the other hand, as the result of the same historical experience, "there remained in the Russian souls a wish to dominate other nations. . . an old, secular craving for annexation and russification of foreign lands." Thus Soviet expansionism is but a continuation of the old Tsarist imperialism, and Stalin appears as a direct descendant of Ivan III of the fifteenth century.

The first three chapters are of an introductory nature, discussing in turn Russian absolutism, Russian peasantry, and the modern Russian intelligentsia. Chapters 4-6 and 11 deal with the mid-nineteenth century Russian radicalism, and chapters 7-10 (over one third of the book) with Russo-Polish relations, chiefly with reference to the Polish insurrection of 1863. The concluding (twelfth) chapter, apparently written for the present edition, attempts to link the author's historical findings with the triumph of Bolshevism in 1917.

Throughout his presentation, the author relies on an impressive array of facts and quotations, accompanied by an eloquent and always interesting comment. But I must confess that I have remained unconvinced of the correctness of the author's reading of Russian history. As I see it, he has erred in two directions. He has tended to consider as peculiarly or even uniquely Russian certain traits which to me look like common human properties, and he has treated some phenomena of Russian history as general and permanent while in reality they have been limited by the co-existence of other tendencies, and have been subject to constant change.

Thus, for instance, when Mr. Kucharzewski stresses the point that the characteristic feature of the policy of the Muscovite sovereigns was their simultaneous desire to strengthen the Tsar's authority at home and to extend the boundaries of their state, he seems to forget that this is a common phenomenon in the history of national states in the process of formation. Neither was the expanding Russian empire of the later period the only empire in the world. Likewise, for the use of such methods as presenting legal claims to coveted foreign territory or advancing liber-

ation slogans when waging aggressive wars, one could find abundant western parallels in almost any period of history. And certainly one could cite many modern historians, besides the Russian Karamzin, who have justified royal absolutism and expansionist foreign policy on the basis of *raison d'état*. On the other hand, Bakunin and Herzen were not alone among the European intellectuals to connect apocalyptic expectations with the revolution of 1848, to fulminate against the spirit of bourgeois civilization, or to exhibit anti-parliamentary tendencies. In fact, Mr. Kucharzewski himself speaks of these western parallels, and yet he insists that the Russian radicals derived their ideas "from the depths of their Russian souls," thus minimizing the importance of the western sources of their inspiration. I can think also of many western examples of "materialistic faith", militant atheism, aggressive feminism, and revolt against "paternal despotism", all of which the author tends to treat as peculiar to Russian Nihilism. And finally, as Mr. Kucharzewski himself indicates, the Communist dictatorship in Russia has had its historical precedent in the Jacobin dictatorship in France. To be sure, there have been peculiar Russian conditions which have permitted the former to go further and last longer than the latter. But should one ignore such general European phenomena as the new technical means of propaganda and suppression, the growth of *etatisme* and of the social unrest among the masses? After all, have we not seen totalitarian regimes in western Europe as well as the prodigious growth of Communism in some of the oldest centers of European civilization, beyond the boundaries of the Soviet zone?

With regard to the Russians themselves, Mr. Kucharzewski tends to make them appear as if throughout history they remained a uniform and unchanging mass. When he groups together, for instance, Ivan the Terrible, Archpriest Avvakum, Nicholas I, Pobedonstev, Tolstoy, and Lenin as typical Russian Nihilists, I wonder whether he is not depriving the term "Nihilism" of its precise meaning. And I am inclined to question the validity of his evidence when he says that Karamzin's nationalism was "consistent with the instincts of the Russian people", that Muraviev was "the exponent of the mood of the Russian public", or that Katkov "expressed the state of mind of the entire Russian people." Of Russo-Polish relations, the author writes with a particular wealth of detail and with natural animation. I fully share his condemnation of the official Russian policy and of the failure of Russian public opinion to understand the Polish point of view. But I cannot follow him when he tries to prove that Bakunin's or Herzen's position was essentially similar to that of the Tsarist government. Neither do I think that it is either fair or realistic to condemn the Russian liberals for not having espoused the cause of complete Polish independence, which obviously could not have been achieved otherwise than by means of Russia's decisive defeat in a major war. To me, this is not a proof of a peculiar Russian chauvinism, and

I do not think that in this respect the Russian record is very different from that of the British in the case of Ireland.

For all these reasons, I cannot accept Mr. Kucharzewski's book as a well-balanced and adequate interpretation of the origins of modern Russia. But what he has to say on the Russian radicals of the mid-nineteenth century (on Nihilism and Bakunin, in particular) or on the Russo-Polish relations of the same period is a valuable and highly interesting contribution to the historical literature on Russia.

Harvard University

Michael Karpovich

JOHN GILLIN: *The Ways of Men*. (New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1948, Pp. 649. \$4.50.)

The appearance of a new anthropology textbook used to be a rare event, but in these days of rapid educational expansion a new text—or the revision of an old one—appears every few months. Gillin's book is not a revision; it is entirely new, with many fresh viewpoints, and it is unique in that it provides adequate coverage of the entire field of anthropology. Previous texts purporting to cover the whole field have tended to be short on physical and long on cultural anthropology, leaving the impression that physical anthropology is not essential and that it is included largely for the sake of completeness. In *The Ways of Men* roughly two-fifths of the space is allotted to physical anthropology, and Gillin ably succeeds in showing how presumptuous it is to try to interpret man's culture without an understanding of his biological characteristics and the natural conditions under which he lives. The result is an unusually well-balanced treatment of anthropology as a unified field.

Gillin's approach to culture is strictly functional, and he has related culture to human behavior by making use of recent developments in the field of psychology. He thereby enriches the concepts of culture and at the same time demonstrates that anthropology alone cannot develop the much-needed science of human relations. One of the best features of the book is Gillin's continual use of pertinent data from borderline disciplines.

From the student's point of view, Gillin's book has a number of valuable features which are largely lacking in other texts. For instance, his introductory chapter contains a realistic appraisal of job opportunities in the field of anthropology, and it also includes a statement of the practical applications of anthropological knowledge, even showing how anthropologists contributed to the recent war effort. Here and there in the text Gillin drops hints about the need for research on particular problems, a device which is likely to stimulate good students. The book is extensively documented, though in an unobtrusive way. References and notes are segregated at the end of each chapter, and a large bibliography of some six hundred titles appears at the end of the book. This

is very convenient for the reader who wishes to follow up any special interests he may develop. The illustrations, while not especially representative, are quite good. Some of those associated with the cultural section of the book are novel, arresting, and very effective. For example, in order to demonstrate how culture may modify physique, "before" and "after" pictures are shown of an American girl who has taken a reducing course in a "charm school". The concluding chapter summarizes current trends in cultural anthropology.

As a whole this book is well organized and clearly written. However, it has some of the defects which go with comprehensiveness. Certain sections are highly compact and numerous concepts are introduced in rapid succession. For this reason beginning students of anthropology—not to mention laymen—are going to find these sections rather tough sledding. Incidentally, this volume suffers from inadequate proof-reading; and some apparently non-typographical errors merit a lift of the eyebrows, as the repeated use of *coup de poign* for *coup de poing* (fist axe). In this reviewer's opinion *The Ways of Men* is not quite the ideal text for the beginning student at the college level, but it is certainly one of the best introductions to the field of anthropology that has appeared to date. It can be recommended to other social scientists who want to find out what the anthropologists are up to.

The University of Texas

T. N. Campbell

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD: *The Sociology of Child Development*. (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1948, Pp., 777. \$4.50.)

This is a timely study of the development of the human personality by an eminent sociologist, Professor Bossard of the University of Pennsylvania. It is a much needed book on the process of socialization, or as the author states, a study of the "normal" child development within "normal" situations. This emphasis on the normal development of a human personality is important for it makes such a study standard useful in the many popular courses of abnormal people, problem or pathological situations and the criminal or juvenile delinquent. These courses, if not actually harmful because of the over emphasis on the abnormal, are misleading especially since in most cases they are offered to students before they have studied the normal social development and behavior. That is, the normal, whatever it may be, must be understood and established as the standard before the abnormal may fully be understood.

Early in the book Professor Bossard proposes a "controlled and directed social movement" in order to remake the world through the next generation. This is in line with the concept of social telesis originated by Lester F. Ward. In several ways social planning was employed by the various

attempts to establish utopian communities, of which the United States had a greater share than any other nation, and in partial planning in economics and agriculture. In the latter good results were attained when the objective was limited. Human life in its collective aspect is so complex that as yet we have found no way in which it can be satisfactorily guided to pre-determined goals or objectives when such can be reached only in the time-span of several generations. After all, man is master of his destiny only to the extent that he is able to overcome the influence of the past experiences of the race upon his own generation.

In Part V: "Some Problem Families", chapters XV and XVI could have been left out without loss. On the other hand, the chapter on "Families Under Stress", an excellent discussion of the effects of major social changes on the family and on the development of the child, could have been expended to include something on the possibility of human culture having in itself the germs of its own destruction through the cumulative influence upon the stability of social institutions and the human personality of the rapid and radical social changes that seem to follow one another progressively faster. The chapter on those children who reject their parents is well organized. It should have been followed by another on parents who reject their children.

In reference to the problems that children of immigrant parents face in adjustment, the statement on the rate of juvenile delinquency is misleading. To quote the author, "The relatively higher rate of juvenile delinquency among second-generation immigrant children is one of the accepted conclusions in the literature on criminology." To what rate as the standard is the rate of these children compared? Taft and Southerland, two of the foremost sociologists on crime, do not support the theory that the second generation's crime rate is any higher than the crime rate of the nation.

The Sociology of Child Development, a well-organized and comprehensive study is a valuable addition to the literature on the development of the human personality. It is practical in its application and will prove useful as a supplementary text in the courses on the family, child welfare, and others. It is the best text available for the course on child development.

The University of Tulsa

Sandor B. Kovacs

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE: *Civilization on Trial*. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1948, Pp., 263. \$3.50.)

Civilization on Trial serves as the general title for a collection of essays and addresses composed by Professor Toynbee for the most part during the past two years. The theme which gives coherence to the collection is the author's attempt to explain historic development by viewing it as an evolving unity the parts of which cannot rightly be understood apart

from the context in which they are found. The selections have been well chosen to point up Professor Toynbee's concept of the dynamic of history. Accordingly the work is a useful introduction to the author's detailed works and to the recently published *Abridgment* of his *Study of History*.

Regardless of one's acceptance of the Toynbee philosophy there is no gainsaying the significance of his technique and approach. *Civilization on Trial* challenges modern men to rise above their parochialism, nationalism and egotism and view our civilization as a part of a whole. In short it is a challenge to man to attain to a perspective, and thus to an understanding, of the world in which he lives. There is, therefore, a much needed sanity and even a touch of irony in Toynbee's approach. If his point of view could gain general credence and application, it might become the foundation on which a harmonious and rational concept of our intercultural relations could be built. Were it to be consistently followed in our dealings with other civilizations the present times of stress and trouble might find their solution not in conflict but in the peaceful inter-pollinization of eastern and western civilizations culminating in the development of a world civilization.

The possibility of the peaceful achievement of a world culture is implicit, but not guaranteed, in all of Toynbee's articles. It *may* come by gradual and nonviolent interaction but it is more likely to come, on Toynbee's own reading of history, by forceful integration which can end only in ultimate self-destruction. The decision as to the means which will be used lies, as it has always lain, in the hands of men. If men will learn detachment, humility and perspective as Toynbee seeks to teach them, the potentiality of a rational solution to our world crisis would be vastly strengthened. Such detachment as Toynbee asks of us is probably attainable only by a Saint—but is that not what man is supposedly called to be?

The University of Texas

H. Malcolm Macdonald

OUTTEN JONES CLINARD: *Japan's Influence on American Naval Power*. (Berkeley, University of California Press, University of California Publications in History, vol. xxxvi, 1947, Pp., 235. \$3.75.)

The chief content of the present volume is a survey of American-Japanese relations, especially in their more controversial aspects, over the period between the Spanish-American War and the entry of the United States into the First World War. This survey, covering as it does a well-worked field, is very competently handled, with full recognition and employment of the great mass of research material available.

The author's further purpose, indeed the prime motivation of his study, is to show how our national strategy in the Pacific "influenced naval

policy, and to trace the development of American naval policy under that influence."

Here he is on more difficult ground. Our national and our naval policies have seldom been closely articulated; and the varied motives which have operated in the expansion or contraction of our naval programs are often difficult to weigh. Undoubtedly, after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was recognized as an increasing menace to our interests and security in the Pacific. But the author's method is neither objective nor altogether trustworthy when he stresses this factor only, with no consideration of the growth of the German Navy, our concerns in the Atlantic area, or the tensions in Europe which weighed increasingly with the approach of the European War.

Thus on page 171 the author reaches this startling conclusion: "That the [U. S.] Naval Construction Act of 1916 was directed against Japan, there can be little doubt." Surely this was not the popular conception at the time, when we were on the very verge of participation in the European conflict. And the author has hard work showing that it was prominent in the mind of our political leaders. After all, Japan was fighting on the side of England against the Central Powers. There was, it is true, well justified suspicion of her aims in the Orient, and sharp challenge of her notorious "Twenty-one Demands" on China. There were also increased fears for the security of the Philippines and moves to hasten their independence. But almost the only reference to the Pacific in President Wilson's speeches on naval rearmament is a statement in his Milwaukee address (Jan. 31, 1916) regarding "the enormous stretch of coast from the Canal to Alaska—from the Canal to the northern corner of Maine."

If one may at times question the author's conclusions regarding the influence of Japan on our naval policy, it is unquestionably well worth while to have this influence presented clearly and in full detail. Of especial interest are the indications, here emphasized that the vision of a future conflict between the white and the yellow races played a part in President Wilson's reluctance to enter the European war. As he told Lansing, he was "more and more impressed with the idea that 'white civilization' and its domination in the world rested largely on our ability to keep this country intact, as we would have to build up the nations ravaged by war."

U. S. Naval Academy

Allen Westcott

EUGENE V. ROSTOW: *A National Policy for the Oil Industry*. (New Haven, Yale University Press. 1948, Pp., 173. \$2.50.)

It is welcome news that interdepartmental program of research in national policy has been organized at Yale University and that extensive plans are laid to publish results of studies by members of the Depart-

ments of Economics and Political Science and the School of Law. *A National Policy for the Oil Industry* by Professor Eugene V. Rostow of the Law School is the first volume in this new series.

Competition in economic life as an essential condition for a successful system of political democracy is a basic assumption in Professor Rostow's analysis. He believes that monopolistic competition is an impelling force which leads directly to state control and to ultimate socialization of industry, and is confident that it would be easier to achieve the values of democracy in the United States if economic power were more evenly distributed.

Today some 22 major oil companies, eight of which were former units of the Standard Oil empire, dominate and control the industry. Although the decree of the Supreme Court in the famous case of *Standard Oil v. United States* (1911) resulted in the dissolution of the oil trust it shaped the pattern of growth of the business organization within the industry. Companies were forced to develop on a regional basis. At the same time they became highly integrated and almost non-competitive. Rostow contends that the tendency toward concentration in the oil industry is not essential to efficient production nor is it a protection against waste of a strategic national resource. He insists that the optimum unit for efficiency in all phases of the oil industry is much smaller than the corporate organization now found controlling most of the industry. He urges "a separation of major companies into separate units controlling their four functions, production, transportation, refining and distribution, and the further horizontal division of some of the dominant units which survive a vertical dissolution of the great companies." This might be achieved through anti-trust proceedings. With this step it would be necessary for the Federal government to follow with the development of an over-all plan of production control, based on an Act of Congress requiring "compulsory unitization of the oil fields". State control over oil production through prorationing having failed to prevent waste, Federal legislation is the present imperative, he insists, and is within the realm of possibility. "The notion that 'mining is not commerce' has been buried in a long series of cases decided in the last decade. At present it would be more accurate to say that state laws regulating oil production are in a field in which Congress has superior powers. . . The passage of a federal law controlling the extraction of oil from the ground would eliminate all state laws and regulation deemed within its purview" (pp 121-22).

A National Policy for the Oil Industry has a definite post-war flavour. Extensive citations of Supreme Court cases of the 'forties' helps to bring the reader up to date in the field of governmental regulation of industry in those areas in which competition is considered essential. Through its 150 pages of context the reader is given a highly concentrated dose of economic theory, legal interpretation and public administrative practice—enough to warrant a larger but more easily digested volume. While the

presentation is a step toward a better integrated approach to the subject there is a tendency to restrict the treatment of economic theory, law and administrative practice to separate chapters. This is conspicuous by the appearance of the professional jargon in the discussion of the various specialized aspects of the subject. Perhaps it is too much to expect that within a brief span of less than twenty-five years social scientists and lawyers could reach an agreement on terminology.

There are exceptionally few inconsistencies in the whole analysis. However, the emphasis on competition in an industry engaged in exhausting the supply of a strategic material comes as a rather startling solution. Professor Rostow recognizes this apparent weakness in his proposal, but he suggests unitization of the oil fields (or the treatment of each oil field as a unit) as a device for overcoming useless waste in production. On the other hand, the insistence on competition not only to break control of the larger oil companies, but to force a lower price for the consumer would result in an increase in consumption and hurry exhaustion of the supply. Irrespective of this apparent inconsistency, the serious student will find *A National Policy for the Oil Industry* an up to the minute analysis of an urgent problem, painstakingly documented and carefully edited. The statesman charged with the responsibility of shaping public policy for the oil industry will find it definite and not evasive. Professor Rostow recommends a forthright program which merits careful consideration.

Boston University

Lashley G. Harvey

E. M. WINSLOW: *The Pattern of Imperialism*. (New York, Columbia University, 1948, Pp., 278. \$3.75.)

This study is an attempt to show: (1) that imperialism is not the result of economic forces, and that the seeds of imperialism are not ineluctably implanted in a capitalistic or a socialistic system; (2) that imperialism, which in the author's view may be pursued by a country organized under either of the two systems mentioned, is a result of man's "failure to match a high order of economic rationality with comparable gumption in his political relationships."

Over half of the text is devoted to critical analysis of the theories of those who have taken economic causation for granted and have developed economic explanations for the imperialistic phenomena. Three chapters summarize the views of writers prior to the appearance of Professor John A. Hobson's *Imperialism*. This and other works of Hobson are analyzed in another chapter. One chapter is devoted to the views of Marx and one to his followers, the "orthodox" as well as the "heretical". Professor Winslow is satisfied with none of the theories he examines, rejecting them all.

Professor Winslow not only believes that capitalism may exist without resort to imperialism, but that a socialistic system also may so exist, but that the same forces that have led capitalistic countries into imperialism are just as likely to produce "socialistic imperialism". The difference apparently would be that the monopolistic, protectionist, and special privilege advocates in the one system would be the "chislers, saboteurs and wreckers" of the second.

Professor Winslow raises the question whether the motives assumed by the theorists to be economic motives are really that or something else. He answers: "Economics is concerned with the creation of value [wealth], not particular things, and economic motive is directed to the creation of value, not particular things. . . .An economic motive, therefore, is not directed toward some specific end, and there are no ultimate ends which can be called economic. The creation of wealth out of scarce resources constitutes the heart of the economic problem, but the problem of selecting specific objectives on which to expend this wealth constitutes not an economic problem but an ethical one. . . ."

He agrees with Professor Schumpeter that imperialism is atavistic. It is his firm conviction that imperialism is a political rather than an economic phenomenon:—"a species of policy which opposes and seeks to destroy all free institutions, including democracy, as well as capitalism, and even especially seeks to turn nationalism from its original character as an expression of popular revolt against autocratic power and infuse it with the spirit of aggressiveness. Being itself a political form, nationalism is an easy victim of the power complex, and much more susceptible to it than is the economic system. Imperialism attacks the economic system through political channels, and the most obvious political channel is the nation-state. That the organization of peoples into regionally segregated political groups is the most potent cause of modern war is the one proposition which today claims the support of those who are unable to accept the Marxian theory that war is a product of capitalism. . . ."

Having thus indicated the nature of imperialism Professor Winslow attempts in eleven pages to explain the way to avoid it. He states: "There is no solution to the power problem in terms of power itself." He believes that Ghandi's tactic of non-violent resistance to the British Raj may be the answer, although he realizes that this has not been used in inter-state relations.

Professor Winslow has made a definitive contribution to the study of imperialism. His style is lucid and his conclusions regarding the nature of imperialism are sound. This reviewer, however, cannot accept the idea that power must be eschewed if a solution to the problem of imperialism is to be found. However, there may be more to be said for his plan than has been said in the concluding pages of this book. It is to be hoped that Professor Winslow will give fuller treatment to his ideas in another work.

University of Redlands

William L. Strauss

JOHN F. CUBER: *Marriage Counseling Practices*. (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948, Pp., 175. \$2.25.)

Professor Cuber has pioneered in a new field in his book *Marriage Counseling Practice* and in so doing he has rendered a great service to those who plan to be professional marriage counselors and to those who by the nature of their work are called on to assume the role of counselor.

The book is divided into two parts; marriage counseling practices and problems, and the profession of marriage counseling. In the first part Mr. Cuber discusses the extent of the need of guidance in our modern society; he points out the nature of marital guidance; the need for careful diagnosis of the subject; and problems of treatment. He then discusses the services rendered by the marriage counselors and the methods by which the services may be accomplished, such as interviewing the patient, providing him with correct and desirable information, helping the patient reach decisions, and carrying out the decisions made. The second part of the book is concerned with the professionalization of marriage counseling in which the types of training needed by marriage counselors, the limitations which counselors should recognize in their work and the current needs which must be satisfied if counseling is to be a reputable profession, are discussed at some length.

One very valuable part of Mr. Cuber's work is the extensive bibliography of books and articles on marriage counseling practice which he has compiled and arranged under the following headings: "works dealing with the rise and development of marriage counseling practice," "works dealing primarily with the techniques and problems of marriage counseling practices," "some non-technical works in psychology, psychiatry, and psychosomatic medicine," and "some background works dealing with the social contexts of marital behavior and counseling practice."

Marriage counseling is one of the very recently developed fields of professional activity. At the present time there are few qualified marriage counselors. *Marriage Counseling Practice* is a book which fills a real need at this early stage in the development of educational courses for marriage counselors. Anyone who is called on to provide counseling service for young people and adults in marital and premarital problems as well as those who are practicing or aspiring to practice the profession of marriage counselor will find Mr. Cuber's book of great assistance and a storehouse of valuable information.

Louisiana State University

Marion B. Smith

JOSEPH ROSENFARB: *Freedom and the Administrative State*. (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1948, Pp., 274. \$4.00.)

In *Freedom and the Administrative State*, Joseph Rosenfarb, a former member of the legal staff of the N.L.R.B., has advanced a sound and

competent argument for the compatability of democratic freedom with a planned economy. A study defender of the principle of planning as the only solution of our present day problems the author affirms that planning can be developed within the framework of democratic government and private ownership. Mr. Rosenfarb sees planning as a reforming movement within democratic society and not as a revolutionary uprooting of traditional forms culminating in a totalitarian regime. The thesis thus presented has appeal for basically it is a challenge to man to apply reason to the solution of his social problems. However, the optimism of Mr. Rosenfarb in regard to the compatability of planning with democracy is another matter. The answer to that problem has not yet been given in favor of the authors contention except in the Scandinavian countries whose problems no where approach the complexities faced by the United States. Perhaps the testing of the validity of the "compatability" thesis is now being made in England which is one reason why the experiments of the labor government are so momentous for us.

In a sense this book is an addition to the list of works refuting Hayek's *Road to Serfdom* and Burnham's *Managerial Revolution*. Rosenfarb contends, as against Hayek and Burnham, that existing governmental techniques and powers are, with minor modifications, sufficient to bring the planned economy into play provided that the will to plan is generally held by the community. In developing his theory the author squarely faces certain issues frequently skimmed over by advocates of a planned society. Interestingly enough the admission is made that under planning strikes would be taboo; the settlement of labor-capital disputes being achieved by compulsory (government) arbitration, and the communist party would be declared illegal as incompatible with democratic assumptions. The bureaucratic structure of the State would be strengthened by the creation of planning agencies in the areas of Resources, Production and Requirements, subject to the overall supervision of the President and his Cabinet. Cultural affairs are to be excluded from the scope of planning and civil liberties, freedom of information and political individuality are to be safeguarded from the encroachments of a too eager bureaucracy.

The problem of the development of the dynamic leadership requisite to sell the planning program to the masses and to keep it in operation is considered in detail and solved in terms of a fluid society constantly revivifying its leadership by recruitment from below—a not un-platonic concept. Chapter eleven which is devoted to the analysis of this problem is one of the outstanding portions of the book.

The hostility evidenced throughout the work to the Taft-Hartley Law seems somewhat unfair and biased, as also does the spirited defense of the Wagner Act. This point of view is probably a resultant of the author's experience as a member of the N.L.R.B.'s legal staff. To many the Taft-Hartley Act is a natural reaction to the extremes to which the

Wagner Act was pushed by the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement and represents a return of the pendulum to a mid-way position.

The treatment in the early chapters of problems of political theory is refreshing. Although nothing new is added to our knowledge on these subjects a conscientious summation of current sociological, economic and political thought is achieved.

As a defense of democratic planning the book is deserving of attention although ranking somewhat below Barbara Wooltton's *Freedom in a Planned Society*. However, for an American reader the orientation towards the American scene makes the book more valuable than Mrs. Wooltton's work which is illustrated by English experiences. While adding little that is new *Freedom and the Administrative State* presents a reasoned and intelligent treatment of one of the most pressing contemporary problems: the possibility of maintaining freedom within the framework of the planned society which Rosenfarb believes to be our inevitable destiny.

The University of Texas

H. Malcolm Macdonald

JOSEPH ACKERMAN AND MARSHALL HARRIS (Editors): *Family Farm Policy*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947, Pp., 518. \$4.00.)

This book not only contains a careful appraisal of family farm policy, but it also is one of the most comprehensive analyses of land tenure available. It includes the formal papers, committee reports, and discussions of seventy-six participants, chiefly from land-grant colleges, universities, federal agencies, and nine nations outside the U. S. A., in a conference held at Chicago in February 1946.

The reader might question the advisability of including discussions of land tenure in other nations. Do other countries have family farms in the sense that this type has developed in the United States? However, the quality of the papers presented for other countries causes one to feel that the value of the book is enhanced by the inclusion of these contributions.

The "family farm" has the following characteristics: (1) The entrepreneurial functions are vested in the family; (2) the family furnishes the labor to operate the farm "with the addition of such supplementary labor as may be necessary, either for seasonal peak loads or during the developmental and transitional stages in the family itself"; and, (3) "a farm large enough, in terms of land, capital, modern technology, and other resources, to employ the labor resources of the farm family efficiently" (p. 389). Less than one-half of all farms in the United States qualify as family farms under this definition. The typical family farm is growing in size, and the crucial question may soon be: When should it stop growing? Many family farms in recent years have become large-scale

farms. Though national policy has always favored family-size units, these farms have declined relatively in importance. Large-scale units and part-time and subsistence farms have gained.

Another problem which complicates family farm policy is the growing dependence of the farmer's welfare upon fluctuations of the business cycle and upon government. As farm production becomes more mechanized and commercialized, the farmer gives up his traditional self-sufficiency for the precarious advantages of the marketplace. When prices are high he feels that "the government should leave the farmer alone"; when prices fall he yells for parity, parity, parity!

Politically, farmer and farm laborer families in this nation are fast becoming a minority group whose views are expressed mainly by three well-known farmers' organizations, at least two of which are dominated by large-scale farmers. Partly as a consequence of this minority status, agricultural families are excluded from the benefits of old-age and survivor's insurance, unemployment insurance, minimum wage legislation, and federal housing aids.

No reader would question the good intentions of these agricultural leaders to improve farm tenure conditions, but serious doubts can be raised as to the effectiveness of the means-end formulae. Most of the suggested or recommended tenure reforms have been stated repeatedly during the past quarter of a century, yet there is probably no field more ignored or neglected by national and state law-making bodies and other action agencies. The researchers have done a good job, but only a few successful beachheads have been established in legislative assemblies. The Federal Land Bank system, organized in 1916, "has had less effect on tenancy than was expected" (p. 482). The Farm Tenant-Purchase program has aided 47,000 farm families, or only a fraction of one per cent of all tenants and farm laborers. The camps built during the 1930's for migratory farm laborers as a conscience balm to placate those agitated by John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath* are now being sold cheap mainly to large-scale farmers.

Contributors to the book might be criticized for not offering more positive recommendations for limiting the size of holdings, graduated land taxes, homestead tax exemptions, or other legislation which might preserve the family farm. The critical reader may ask what this book proposes to prevent large-scale farmers from growing larger or to keep nonfarm investors from acquiring ownership of more farm land. Not one word of protest is raised against the potential "land grab" of several hundred million acres of public grazing lands by large western livestock producers, which, if it occurs will be a direct blow to family farm policy.

Because tenure problems affect two-thirds of the world's population who get their living by working directly upon the land, this book fulfills a need for an up-to-date treatment of these age-old, worldwide problems.

Oklahoma A. & M. College

Robert T. McMillan

RUFUS TERRAL: *The Missouri Valley - Land of Drouth, Flood and Promise*. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947, Pp., 274. \$3.75.)

The Missouri Valley with an area of over 500,000 square miles and covering part or all of ten states is drawn together by the Missouri River, "the common denominator". The Missouri is recognized as an uncontrolled and undeveloped river; but the inhabitants of the valley cannot agree upon the proper means of developing it. Mr. Terral, a member of the staff of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, believes that a unified development of the valley is needed, a program which will consider the problems of flood control, irrigation, navigation, hydro-electric power, industrialization, and soil conservation.

The first eighteen chapters, about three-fourths of the book, deal with such topics as control of ground and surface waters, the complex of water laws, research and experiments in reseeding and controlled grazing of the range lands, the successes and failures of irrigation, the attempts to make the river navigable, the general lack of hydro-electric power, and the need for more small industries especially in the upper valley. The last four chapters tell of the fight between the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation over which agency should be given the assignment of developing the Missouri River. The Pick and Sloan plans presented by the two agencies, respectively, are analyzed; and weaknesses and strong points are pointed out. The compromise Pick-Sloan Plan is shown to be the result of a shotgun wedding of the two agencies in their common opposition to the proposed Missouri Valley Authority.

Mr. Terral states that "MVA is the only possible agency above the quarrel" between the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. He also favors the use of the corporate device of a regional authority. "Because questions that ought to be settled on the ground do not have to be referred to someone in Washington, the corporation can give citizens quick, decisive action they are accustomed to expect from well-run private businesses."

The style of the book is interesting and clear. An index, a bibliography, and a short section of notes in lieu of regular foot-notes are included. The author obtained much of his material from interviews with officials of the various governmental agencies operating in the area. Government publications and newspaper editorials are also quoted. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States is erroneously cited on page 50 as being Section 3, Article 4 of that document.

This work is a welcome addition to the all too few books which have been written about the conservation and development of the natural resources of the various regions of the United States.

Texas Christian University

Comer Clay

MARY BYNUM PIERSON: *Graduate Work in the South*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947, Pp., 265. \$4.00.)

This book is a careful and useful study of the development of graduate work in the South. The book was sponsored by the Conference of Deans of Southern Graduate Schools.

After a brief study of the beginnings of graduate work in America, and especially in the South, Mrs. Pierson devotes Chapter Four to a study of influences since 1900 on Southern graduate work, with emphasis on educational associations, philanthropic foundations, and university presses. Chapter Five discusses Graduate School organization and practice in Southern universities. Chapter Six is a study of the separate graduate and professional schools for Negroes. The last chapter summarizes the well-known inadequacies of higher studies in the South. An appendix gives outline of degree requirements in Southern graduate schools, and gives statistics about graduate degrees awarded in each graduate school. There is a good fourteen page bibliography.

Mrs. Pierson's book meets a real need. It is well written and carefully documented. It should be on the shelves of all persons interested in the development of advanced education in the South.

The University of Texas

A. P. Brogan

Other Books Received

- Bassett, H. Y.: *What does Industry Expect of a Community?* (University, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1948, pp. 19.)
- Bean, L. H.: *How to Predict Elections.* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, pp. 196. \$2.50.)
- Dodd, J. H.; Hasek, C. W.: *Economics: Principles and Applications.* (New York, South-Western Publishing Co., 1948, pp. 729.)
- Ellingston, J. R.: *Protecting our Children from Criminal Careers.* (New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948, pp. 374. \$5.00.)
- Hicks, C. M.: *An Introduction to Business*, Revised Edition. (New York, Rinehart & Co., 1948, pp. 715. \$4.75.)
- Gluckhohn, C. & Murray, H. A.: *Personality: In Nature, Society and Culture.* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, pp. 561. \$6.00.)
- Kelly, A. H. & Harbison, W. A.: *The American Constitution, Its Origin and Development.* (New York, W. W. Norton Co., 1948, pp. 940.)
- Leland, W. G.: *U. N. E. S. C. O. and the Defense of Peace.* (Stanford University Press, 1948, pp. 36. \$1.00.)
- Milligan, M. M.: *The Inside Story of the Pendergast Machine.* (New York, Charles Scribners Co., 1948, pp. 279. \$3.50.)
- MacCarthur, K. A.: *The Bible and Human Rights*, (New York, The Women's Press, 1948, pp. 75. \$.60 cents.)
- Purcell, Victor: *The Chinese in Malaya.* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1948, pp. 327. \$6.00.)
- Rose, Arnold: *The Negro in America.* (New York, Harper & Bros., 1948, pp. 325. \$3.75.)
- Syndmon, C. S.: *The Development of Southern Sectionalism 1819-1848*, Vol. V of *History of the South.* (Baton Rouge, University of Louisiana Press, 1948, pp. 400. \$6.00.)
- Saveth, E. N.: *American Historians and European Immigrants, 1875-1925.* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. 244. \$3.00.)

Sivaswamy, K. G.: *The Madras Ryotwari Tenant*. (Madras, South Indian Federation of Agricultural Worker's Unions, 1947, pp. 31. Re. 1.)

Sivaswamy, K. G.: *Rights of Ryotwari Tenants*. (Madras, South Indian Federation of Agricultural Worker's Unions, 1947, pp. 31. Re. 1.)

Sivaswamy, K. G.: *Compensation for Zamindars*. (Madras, South Indian Federation of Agricultural Worker's Unions, 1947, pp. 29. Re. 1.)

Wright, Gordon: *Reshaping French Democracy*. (New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948, pp. 277. \$3.50.)

News Notes

Professor William L. Strauss, of the Department of Economics, University of Texas, has resigned his position as Secretary-Treasurer of the Southwestern Social Science Association, having accepted a position on the staff of the University of Redlands, Redlands, California. Dr. S. A. Caldwell, President of the Association, has appointed Dr. Eastin Nelson, Department of Economics, University of Texas, as the new Secretary-Treasurer.

Dr. J. L. Charlton, Associate Professor in the Department of Rural Economics and Sociology, University of Arkansas, attended the land tenure research workshop held at the University of Wyoming science camp during August. Assistant Professor Virgil B. Fielder, of the same department, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor, and Instructor Harold Scoggins to the rank of assistant professor. The department has also appointed Mr. W. M. Morrison, Jr., as research assistant to aid with research on marketing projects.

Mr. Bascom K. Doyle has resigned as research associate in agricultural economics at Louisiana State University to accept an assistant professorship at the College of Agriculture, College Station, Mississippi. Mr. Morris L. McGough, who took his Master's degree with the department in May 1948, has accepted a position with the Doane Agricultural Service, St. Louis, Missouri.

Dr. Joe R. Campbell is a new member of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology, A. and M. College of Texas. A recent recipient of a Ph.D. degree from Cornell, Doctor Campbell will teach courses in farm management. His undergraduate work was done at the A. and M. College of Texas, and his M. S. at Louisiana State University.

Dr. A. S. Lang has resigned his position as Director of the Department of Economics and Business at Texas State College for Women, to accept the position of Dean of the School of Business and Professor of Economics at Baylor University, Waco, Texas, effective September 1948.

Professor Willis Tate, Department of Sociology, Southern Methodist University, has been elected by the Board of Trustees to the position of Dean of Students, succeeding Dean A. C. Zumbrunnen, retired. Dean Zumbrunnen has accepted an appointment as Professor of Sociology at Missouri Valley College, Marshall, Missouri. Dr. Walter T. Watson, Chairman of the Department of Sociology, and Dr. Allen W. Eister, Assistant Professor of Sociology, have received research grants from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Doctor Watson's

problem is on "Neighboring in Dallas by Census Tracts," and Doctor Eister's grant is for clerical and other aids in completing a manuscript upon which he is engaged.

Professor F. S. Williams, of the College of Business Administration, University of Arkansas, has resigned to accept a position with Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

A major in advertising is being established in the Marketing Department of the College of Business Administration of the University of Arkansas.

Professor John H. D. Spencer, Department of Economics, College of Mines and Metallurgy, El Paso, is on leave of absence to complete his doctorate at the University of North Carolina. Mr. Kenneth W. Olm has been added to the staff as instructor. Professor Wade Hartrick, of the same department, is at present completing a research study on foreign trade over Texas ports.

Survey methods of research will be the subject of two new courses to be offered jointly by the Sociology and Psychology Departments of the University of Kansas. Dr. Anthony Smith, of the Psychology Department, will teach "Opinion and Consumer Research" in the fall semester, and Dr. E. Jackson Baur, of the Sociology Department, will teach "Techniques of Opinion Measurement" in the spring term. The courses will stress the opinion and consumer survey methods, including the measurement of public opinion by questionnaire interviews of a population sample, with emphasis on field work and laboratory analysis.

Dr. Francis Heller, of the University of Virginia, has been appointed Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Kansas. His principal field will be public law. Dr. James Drury has been promoted to Assistant Professor, and Instructor Tom Page has resigned to resume his graduate study at the University of Minnesota.

Beginning in the fall term of 1948 the University of Kansas, through the Department of Political Science and the Bureau of Government Research, is inaugurating a program of graduate training for city management. The program is open to students with a bachelor's degree in arts, law, or certain engineering branches, and consists of a two-year course, one of which is devoted to graduate work at the University and one of which consists of an internship in an approved city office. The second year is combined with the preparation of the thesis and enrolment in a seminar for apprentices. Approximately six fellowships of \$1000

each will be awarded each year, the stipend to be paid during the internship year.

The agricultural journalism curriculum of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology, A. and M. College of Texas, has been transferred to the Liberal Arts School, where it is now established as the Department of Journalism.

The Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology, A. and M. College of Texas, is currently engaged in three research projects: a study of the health problems and needs of Texas by counties and type-of-farming areas; a study of the rural organization of Val Verde County; and a study of community organization in Caldwell, Texas. The department sponsored this summer the third annual Rural Church Conference, which was attended by some 150 delegates. Fifteen of the addresses delivered at the conference have been duplicated for distribution to interested persons.

The Department of Business Administration and Economics, New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, announces the addition of three new staff members: Mr. Robert S. Raymond, Assistant Professor of Economics; Miss Janie Weinberger, Assistant Professor of Business Administration; and Mr. Charles M. Dieffenbach, Instructor.

Dr. Joseph C. Pray, Professor of Government, University of Oklahoma, has been appointed Associate Dean of the Graduate College of that institution. He will still devote half his time to the department. Doctor Pray is a past program chairman of the Southwestern Social Science Association.

Mr. James Watson has been appointed Instructor in Government at the University of Oklahoma. Mr. Watson holds the certificate of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, and will teach a new course in "Government of the Soviet Union".